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Abstract  
Prior research shows that firm innovation policies can be affected by the perceptional 
lens of their top executives. However, existing literature has exclusively focused on CEOs and 
ignored the interactional effect among CEO and non-CEO executives. In this study, I examine 
the effect of having different opinions within a firm’s TMT and find that belief dispersion 
within the TMT is positively related to corporate innovative efficiency. This result still holds 
after considering potential endogeneity in the baseline regressions. Next, I use three subsample 
analyses to indicate that information sharing and bias reduction are potentially the channels of 
the positive effect of belief dispersion. The last section of this thesis provides evidence that 
illustrates a positive relationship between TMTs belief dispersion and firm performance, 
yielding further corporate implications.  
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1. Introduction  
Why did some U.S. foreign-policy decisions such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the 
Cuban missile crisis, and the escalation of the Vietnam War end disastrously? Janis (1972) 
identified a cluster of symptoms for what he coined the term “groupthink”, which refers to a 
phenomenon that people in a decision-making cohort has similar beliefs, and argued that the 
decisions mentioned above that lead to adverse consequences are the victim of groupthink. 
Moreover, Bénabou (2013) argues that groupthink can lead to collective delusions in groups, 
organizations and markets, which thus cause a denial of bad news and information avoidance 
among decision-makers. Groupthink in senior management can also be a contributing factor 
for the failure of corporation, such as the collapse of Enron and Worldcom (Cohan 2002; 
Samuelson 2001). In contrast, different opinions and dispersed beliefs among a firm’s top 
executives can improve the efficiency of the firm’s decision-making. As argued by Nooyi, the 
former CEO of PepsiCo, constructive fights and constructive dialogues can lead to a better 
outcome1. This anecdotal evidence suggests that it is important to understand the implication 
of collective beliefs among decision makers.  
Many decisions are made based on personal beliefs, considering the likelihood of 
success; however, these beliefs are subjected to behavioral biases (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). 
These biases can alter individuals’ cognitive base, thereby affecting their beliefs about future 
uncertain outcomes (Einhorn & Hogarth 1978). One of the most prominent behavior biases is 
overconfidence (Plous 1993). Previous psychology literature has documented that 
overconfident individuals are prone to have irrational and optimistic beliefs (Alicke 1985; 
Einhorn & Hogarth 1978; Stone 1994; Svenson 1981). In the field of corporate finance, since 
the seminal work of Malmendier and Tate (2005), overconfidence has received growing 
                                                          
1 See Clifford (2016).  
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attention. For instance, it has been shown that overconfidence has an explanatory power toward 
a firm’s investment distortion (Malmendier & Tate 2005), valued-destroying mergers 
(Malmendier & Tate 2008), and the success of corporate innovation (Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 
2012).  
While the existing literature highlights the relation between optimistic managerial 
belief and corporate decision, it has only focused on the belief of one single decision-maker, 
i.e., the CEO. In this study, I extend the literature by examining the beliefs held by the top 
management team (TMT) members regarding their firm’s prospects. This extension is 
meaningful because firm decisions are not formulated and made solely by CEOs. Instead, firm 
decisions are often made by the firm’s top management team (TMT), consisting of the firm’s 
top executives, through multiple discussions and debates (Hambrick & Mason 1984; Murray 
1989). This corporate decision-making practice highlights the importance of TMTs. Moreover, 
the “upper echelon” theory (Hambrick & Mason 1984), suggests that a firm’s outcomes are the 
reflection of the value and cognitive bases of the firm’s TMT, showing the importance of TMTs 
belief. However, how the distribution of TMTs belief (i.e., congruent or dispersed) can affect 
corporate decision-making is not clear. This study aims to fill in the gap and adds to our 
understanding of this critical question.  
To be specific, this study examines the effect of TMTs belief dispersion on corporate 
innovation output. Innovation arguably is one of the most crucial corporate issues, as it matters 
a firm’s long-run competitive advantage and even the survival of firms (Eisdorfer & Hsu 2011). 
The research of overconfidence in corporate content has found that overconfident CEOs are 
better innovators (Galasso & Simcoe 2011; Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 2012). This effect of 
overconfidence arises from CEOs' belief about their firms. That is either overestimation of 
expected future outcomes or underestimation of risk (Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 2012). 
Regarding other non-overconfident (potentially rational or risk-averse) executives in TMTs, 
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they may hold a different belief. Such different belief can lead to the opinion that against the 
risky innovative investment favored by overconfident CEOs. Also, another stream of 
innovation literature finds that TMTs characteristics can influence the success of innovation 
activities (e.g., Alexiev et al. 2010; Daellenbach, McCarthy & Schoenecker 1999). These two 
strands of literature jointly suggest a link between TMTs belief dispersion and firm’s 
innovative outcomes, which is the main focus of this thesis.2   
From the bright-side perspective, belief dispersion may yield a high innovation 
efficiency in firms3. First, belief dispersion introduces a dissent among top executives, thereby 
reducing the biases in TMTs’ decision-making process (Asch 1955; Landier, Sraer & Thesmar 
2009). TMTs with belief dispersion thus can produce quality decisions and lead to higher 
innovation efficiency in their firms. Second, belief dispersion encourages knowledge and 
information sharing among TMTs’ members (Che & Kartik 2009; Malenko 2014; Parks & 
Nelson 1999). This activity can prepare a better knowledge base for TMTs’ decisions, 
especially for those information-intense decisions (e.g., innovative decisions). Lastly, TMTs 
with belief dispersion can imply that innovative decisions made by their TMT are less arbitrary 
and based on more objective information (Landier, Sraer & Thesmar 2009). It would encourage 
their subordinators such as the employees in research and development (R&D) division to put 
more effort into innovative activities since those employees will view innovation as having a 
higher chance of success if they observe belief dispersion in such a management team. Hence, 
more efforts will be spent during the implementation of innovation. Therefore, my first 
                                                          
2 The term “belief” refers to each executive’s opinion about their firm’s future performance. I also use the words, 
“belief dispersion”, to describe a dispersed belief within TMTs. 
3 I acknowledge that existing literature also suggests belief dispersion could have a dark side (Stasser, Taylor & 
Hanna 1989; Stasser & Titus 1987; Van Ginkel & Van Knippenberg 2009). For instance, Carnevale and Probst 
(1998) argue that disagreement within a team could lead to the team members’ cognitive overload and thus 
obstruct cognitive flexibility and creative thinking, which is detrimental to innovation outcomes. However, the 
evidence does not support the alternative hypothesis.  
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hypothesis argues that there is a positive relation between TMTs belief dispersion and corporate 
innovation efficiency.  
I test my hypothesis by examining whether TMTs belief dispersion can lead to high or 
low efficiency in the firm’s innovative activities. Firms with high efficiency in those activities 
should present an ability to generate more innovative outputs per dollar of R&D spending. 
Thus, I regress the TMTs belief dispersion (measured by the standard deviation of executives’ 
confidence levels in TMTs) on three standard innovation measures (i.e., the number of future 
citations received by each patent, the estimated market value for each patent, and the number 
of patents applied by a firm) and also control for firm’s R&D expense.  
The results from the baseline regressions show a positive relationship between TMT 
belief dispersion and the firm’s ability to produce high-impact patents (measured by citation 
counts and patent value). These findings are consistent with the expected effects of belief 
dispersion, which are reducing biases in decision-making processes and arriving at a better 
knowledge base for decisions. Hence, the TMTs with belief dispersion can generate relatively 
more high-impact patents per R&D spending.  
 I acknowledge that the baseline results may be subject to endogeneity. Malmendier, 
Tate and Yan (2011) also illustrate that CEOs' early-life experience can affect the level of 
overconfidence that they are subjected to. Such an effect of personal experience on belief may 
not be limited to CEOs and also can be found in other TMTs members. Also, successful career 
achievement can provide a positive signal to each executive about their skill and ability. This 
signal would enhance their positive views about the firm (Camerer & Lovallo 1999). However, 
the enhancement in positive belief is likely to be different across the TMT members, which can 
increase belief dispersion in the TMT (i.e., reverse causality). Therefore, belief dispersion is 
likely to be endogenous. Three additional tests are thus performed to mitigate endogeneity 
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concerns. Two of these tests make use of plausible exogenous in TMTs belief dispersion, and 
another one employs a two-stage least square (2SLS) approach with an instrumental variable 
(IV).  
The first robustness test utilizes the events of the executive transition. Since executive 
turnovers will change the membership of TMTs, it may generate some exogenous variations in 
TMTs belief distribution. Following executive turnovers, firms that have experienced a 
significant amount of increase in TMTs belief dispersion are defined as treatment firms. The 
control group consists of the firms that have experienced a small increase or a decrease in 
TMTs belief dispersion after executive turnovers. Based on a matched sample, I estimate the 
baseline regressions by using the data around executive turnovers. The result indicates that 
treatment firms have higher innovation efficiency than the control firms after experiencing 
executive turnovers.  
The second robustness test uses the dot-com bubble as a quasi-natural experiment. 
When the bubble burst, it is likely to cause an exogenous variation in TMTs belief distribution. 
Using a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach (the treatment group is the internet firms with 
high belief dispersion and the control group is other firms in the sample), I show that an 
exogenous decrease in TMTs belief dispersion leads to a significant reduction in firm’s 
innovation efficiency.  
In the last robustness test, I use as an IV, the lagged industry median belief dispersion, 
and run the 2SLS regression model. The result obtained from this test confirms the positive 
effect of belief dispersion on the effectiveness of corporate innovative investments. Overall, 
these three robustness tests suggest that my baseline results are robust.  
If TMTs belief dispersion is beneficial for corporate innovation, one might wonder the 
underlying mechanism. Thus, I further perform three subsample analyses to identify the 
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potential driving force for the effect of belief dispersion on innovation. The results indicate that 
the positive relationship between TMTs belief dispersion and corporate innovation efficiency 
is more pronounced in three types of firms. These are the firms with overconfident CEOs, the 
firms with a chief technology officer (CTO) in the TMT, and the firms in high-tech industries. 
These typical firms are likely to have a better information-sharing environment for innovation, 
suggested by previous literature (e.g., Adler & Ferdows 1990; Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 2012). 
Thus, information sharing is possibly the underlying channel that belief dispersion goes 
through and yields high corporate innovation efficiency.  
Since belief dispersion plausibly leads to a better decision-making process, this effect 
could have impacts beyond corporate innovation activities. Hence, the last section attempts to 
provide an implication about the relationship between TMTs belief dispersion and firm 
performance. By using OLS estimation, I find that TMTs belief dispersion is positively related 
to the two standard measures of firm performance, i.e., Tobin’s Q and return on asset (ROA). 
To mitigate endogeneous concerns, I re-run the regression with firm-fixed effects and use a 
2SLS approach. The estimated coefficients of belief dispersion are still positive and significant.  
In summary, my empirical results show a positive causal effect of TMTs belief 
dispersion on their firm’s innovation efficiency. This effect is more sound in firms where the 
initiative of innovation is greater. Moreover, belief dispersion is likely to yield better corporate 
performance.  
This thesis can first contribute to the literature of TMTs on corporate performance and 
policies (Bantel & Jackson 1989; Bushman, Dai & Zhang 2016; Finkelstein & Hambrick 1990; 
Hambrick & Mason 1984; Wiersema & Bantel 1992). For instance, Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) argue that TMTs members are powerful actors in a firm, and their cognitive bases can 
affect the firm’s strategic choices and performance levels. Furthermore, research on human 
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relations in a team highlights that team characteristics can shape the behavior of people that 
performs jointly with others (Stewart 2003; Terrion & Ashforth 2002). As argued by Terrion 
and Ashforth (2002), individuals performing in team contexts often forego their own identities. 
Instead, there take the identity of their team (Terrion & Ashforth 2002). Regarding the results 
in this thesis, it shows that dispersion within TMTs, as a team attribute, is beneficial for the 
TMTs decision-making. Such an attribute can enlarge the knowledge base in TMTs and thus 
improve corporate innovation performance.  
Secondly, this thesis can contribute to the literature of corporate innovation (Aghion, 
Van Reenen & Zingales 2013; Hirshleifer, Hsu & Li 2013; Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 2012). 
Existing literature has shown that some TMT attributes can affect a firm’s innovation policy. 
For instance, Alexiev et al. (2010) show that TMTs advice-seeking behavior is an important 
determinant of firms’ exploratory innovation. Furthermore, the perceptual lens of top managers 
also has a significant impact on the firm’s commitment to innovation. Both studies from 
Galasso and Simcoe (2011) and Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) find that overconfident 
CEOs are more likely to pursue innovation. In this study, I identify a novel factor that 
contributes to innovation outcomes. I find that TMTs with dispersed beliefs can encourage 
information sharing among the members and improves the teams’ knowledge base for 
innovative decisions. Belief dispersion within TMTs can increase the effectiveness of corporate 
innovative activities. Thus, my thesis can provide some implications for innovative information 
gathering, screening, and processing within TMTs and firms.  
Lastly, my findings contribute to the literature of behavioral corporate finance (Bolton, 
Scheinkman & Xiong 2006; Goel & Thakor 2008; Malmendier & Tate 2005) by highlighting 
the important role of the dispersion of executives’ cognitive biases (not limited to CEOs). 
Malmendier and Tate (2015) suggest that behavioral biases (e.g., CEO overconfidence) matter 
not only for the choices and outcomes of the agents who are subject to them. They also matter 
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for the interaction between biased agents and potentially rational agents. Also, Campbell et al. 
(2011) show the importance of considering different levels of CEO optimism in research. My 
study follows these two suggestions. In this study, I focus on the deviation of executives’ 
beliefs about their firm’s future performance within TMTs. Thus, this thesis can consider 
multiple levels of overconfidence and also potentially catches the beliefs from rational and 
underconfident agents. To my knowledge, the present study is one of the few studies that 
examine the interactive effect among biased and rational executives. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. 
Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes data, methodology and variable, and 
reports the summary statistics. Section 5 presents the baseline results and three robustness 
checks for endogeneity. Section 6 shows the results from three subsample analyses to discuss 
the underlying channel. Section 7 provides the implication of belief dispersion on overall firm 
performance. Section 8 concludes this study.  
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2. Literature reviews  
Overconfidence is one of the most influential behavior biases that has been documented 
by the psychology literature. For example, Plous (1993) stated in his book, “No problem in 
judgment and decision making is more prevalent and more potentially catastrophic than 
overconfidence” (Plous 1993, p. 217). In terms of its manifestation, Moore and Healy (2008) 
notice that three are faces of overconfidence. Overconfidence can first be defined as 
“overestimation”, a manifestation for individuals that overestimates their ability, performance, 
or chance of success. The second definition of overconfidence is “better-than-average”. It is a 
tendency that people believe themselves to be better than others. The last one is “overprecision”. 
It occurs when people exhibit excessive certainty in their beliefs. All these manifestations of 
overconfidence have been examined in the previous psychology literature (e.g., Fischhoff, 
Slovic & Lichtenstein 1977; Larrick, Burson & Soll 2007; Soll & Klayman 2004).  
The extensive literature has documented the importance of overconfidence in social 
science and psychology (e.g., Alicke 1985; Larwood & Whittaker 1977; Svenson 1981). 
Overconfidence is also considered as one of the important determinants of wars, 
entrepreneurial failures, and stock market bubbles (Camerer & Lovallo 1999; Howard & 
Howard 1984; Scheinkman & Xiong 2003).  
However, in the field of corporate finance, overconfidence had received little attention 
prior to 2005. In a seminal paper of managerial overconfidence, Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
illustrate how it can affect corporate investment decisions. Since overconfident CEOs are prone 
to overestimate their ability and skills, they believe that the market underestimates the firm's 
stock price. Such biased beliefs yield severe consequences for corporate finance and investment 
decisions. First, overconfident CEOs will view external financing costly. Due to the optimistic 
beliefs on the firm’s future performance, they believe that the firm’s stock is undervalued. As 
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a result, overconfident CEOs will hesitate to raise external funds by issuing equity, which can 
lead to an underinvestment problem when a firm’s internal fund is insufficient. Second, 
overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate the investment outcomes, which leads to an 
overinvestment problem, especially when the internal fund is sufficient. 
The empirical evidence in Malmendier and Tate (2005) is consistent with the above 
arguments. Firstly, CEOs are classified as overconfident CEOs when they fail to divest firm-
specific risk in their stock and option holding accounts. One example is their late exercising 
behaviors of the vested stock options. This option-based measure of overconfidence was built 
on the theoretical framework of Hall and Murphy (2002). Rational executives are prone to 
exercise in-the-money stock options immediately after the vesting periods to diversify their 
exposures to the firm’s specific risk. Only overconfident CEOs, induced by optimistic beliefs 
of the firm’s future performance, would postpone exercising those vested options. Second, 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) investigate the relation between CEO overconfidence and the 
level of sensitivity of corporate investment to the firm’s internal funds. They find that firms 
managed by overconfident CEOs have higher sensitivity of investment to internal funds than 
their rational peers.  
Since the publication of Malmendier and Tate (2005), many researchers have started to 
investigate the impact of managerial overconfidence on a variety of corporate behaviors (e.g., 
Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner & Nanda 2015; Bolton, Scheinkman & Xiong 2006; Malmendier 
& Tate 2008). However, there is a debate on whether shareholders can benefit from hiring an 
overconfident CEO. In one strand of literature, managerial overconfidence is viewed as a value-
destroying mechanism (e.g., Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner & Nanda 2015; Malmendier & Tate 
2005, 2008). For instance, Malmendier and Tate (2008) illustrate that overconfident CEOs are 
prone to make value-destroying M&A decisions. But, another strand of literature documents 
the positive impacts from the presence of overconfident CEOs. For example, Hirshleifer, Low 
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& Teoh (2012) show that overconfident CEOs tend to engage more in innovative activities. 
Phua, Tham and Wei (2018) find that overconfident CEOs are better leaders than their peers. 
They can attract and maintain a stable relationship with suppliers and employees. Other studies 
also theoretically or empirically show some benefits of employing overconfident CEOs (e.g., 
Campbell et al. 2011; Galasso & Simcoe 2011; Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 2012; Yu 2014). 
Such mixed views on CEO overconfidence encourage further research on managerial 
behavior bias. For instance, little research on overconfidence has been extended in the setting 
of a top management team (i.e., TMT). One exception is Meissner, Schubert and Wulf (2017), 
which find that demographic diversity reduces team-level of overconfidence while the average 
tenure of the team increases it. Although Meissner, Schubert, and Wulf (2018) have considered 
the determinants of team-level of overconfidence, the consequence of such characteristic is 
unexplored. Moreover, no study has considered the dispersion of overconfidence in a team, 
especially in TMTs. Such a gap in the literature motivates my study, which aims to investigate 
how top executives with different levels of confidence will yield positive or negative impacts 
on firm value.  
 My study is also closely related to the literature on top management teams (i.e., TMTs), 
which adopts a multi-agent perspective (e.g., Bebchuk, Cremers & Peyer 2011; Bushman, Dai 
& Zhang 2016; Jayant, Ebru & Anand 2009). This perspective views top executives as a team 
rather than as individuals. Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest that TMTs are powerful actors 
in many firms. The firm’s performances are reflections of the values and cognitive bases of the 
TMTs. Many studies also highlight the importance of TMTs’ characteristics (e.g., Bantel & 
Jackson 1989; Finkelstein & Hambrick 1990; Priem 1990). For example, Wiersema and Bantel 
(1992) find that firms managed by a TMT with lower average age, shorter tenure, or higher 
educational level are more likely to undergo strategic changes.  
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Another strand of TMT literature investigates the effects of TMT heterogeneity (e.g., 
Alexiev et al. 2010; Hambrick, Cho & Chen 1996; Knight et al. 1999; Murray 1989), but the 
impact of TMT heterogeneity on firm value is under-debate. From the value increasing 
perspective (Cox 1994), group diversity can bring some benefits to organizations. For example, 
gender diversity in boardroom can yield a positive effect on firm performance and corporate 
governance (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera 2008; Francoeur, Labelle & Sinclair-Desgagné 2008). 
In contrast to the value increasing view, some others consider “diversity as process loss” (e.g., 
Jehn, Northcraft & Neale 1999; Pelled 1996). The reason is that group diversity can lead to 
high potential costs and worse organizational performance.  
Following the literature on TMTs, due to the uncertainty of a firm’s future performance, 
members in the TMT may also hold different beliefs. For example, overconfident team 
members may hold optimistic beliefs (Moore & Healy 2008), but underconfident ones could 
have negative views. Furthermore, such dispersion in beliefs within the TMTs members may 
affect the firm’s corporate decisions, as many decisions and opinions are rooted from personal 
beliefs (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). One prominent manifestation of heterogeneous beliefs 
within a group is disagreement. Many studies have discussed how different beliefs can lead to 
disagreement (e.g., Bolton, Scheinkman & Xiong 2006; Harrison & Kreps 1978; Thakor & 
Whited 2010). Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) argue that overconfidence is a significant source 
of disagreement in the stock market. This disagreement is introduced by the optimistic beliefs 
from overconfident investors and the realistic beliefs from rational investors. Moreover, 
Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003) argue that individuals tend to view information as more 
credible if it is consistent with their own prior beliefs or preferences. As a result, each member 
within the TMTs may insist on the choices in their favor, resulting in disagreement during 
group decision-making processes. 
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Although the dispersion in beliefs leads to disagreement has been documented, how 
such a dispersion within the TMTs members can affect corporate decision-making and firm 
performance is still little known. For example, overconfident TMTs members may prefer risky 
investment, but rational and underconfident members may prefer an investment with low risk. 
Thus, these diverse beliefs and preferences can induce disagreement within TMTs and yield 
significant impacts on corporate decision-making, especially investment decisions with high 
uncertainty.  
This study explores innovation as it is arguably one of the most crucial decisions for 
firms (Eisdorfer & Hsu 2011; Schumpeter 1950). Furthermore, innovative projects are highly 
risky and challenging, and the results of it take a long time to resolve (Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 
2012). Successful innovation can provide long-term competitive advantages and survival 
ability (Eisdorfer & Hsu 2011). Innovation is also the lifeblood of change because it can destroy 
or recreate a firm (Schumpeter 1950), and circumvent or raises market barriers (Porter 1985). 
Because of its importance and significance, many researchers have attempted to understand the 
key factors contributing to innovation success (e.g., Acharya & Subramanian 2009; Baranchuk, 
Kieschnick & Moussawi 2014; Gao & Chou 2015; He & Tian 2013; Hirshleifer, Hsu & Li 
2013).   
The positive impact of CEO overconfidence on corporate innovation has been 
documented.  Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) show that overconfident CEOs are prone to 
invest heavily in innovative projects. This impact of overconfidence arises from either 
overestimation of expected future outcomes or underestimation of risk (Hirshleifer, Low & 
Teoh 2012). Overconfident CEOs are likely to take more risk, so they engage in more 
innovation activities than risk-averse peers. Similar results and conclusions also can be found 
in Galasso and Simcoe (2011). Another strand of innovation literature focuses on TMTs (e.g., 
Alexiev et al. 2010; Daellenbach, McCarthy & Schoenecker 1999; Nijstad, Berger-Selman & 
19 
 
De Dreu 2014; Young, Charns & Shortell 2001). They find that TMT’s characteristics can 
influence the success of innovation activities. For example, Daellenbach, McCarthy and 
Schoenecker (1999) demonstrate that the presence of technical orientation managers in TMTs 
increases the commitment to innovation. Alexiev et al. (2010) examine the relation between 
TMT advice-seeking behavior and innovation activity. They show that TMT heterogeneity can 
improve the effectiveness of using internal advice to increase innovation.  
The above two strands of literature show that both CEO overconfidence and the 
characteristics of TMTs have significant impacts on corporate innovation activities. However, 
no study has tried to combine these two strands. In this paper, I intend to fill the gap by showing 
how the belief dispersion within TMTs members can affect corporate innovation activities. 
Therefore, my study enhances our understanding of related important issues and contributes to 
the literature on behavioral finance, TMTs, and corporate innovation.  
  
20 
 
3. Hypothesis development  
Overconfidence is the most prevalent and persistent behavior bias and is closely related 
to individual beliefs regarding the uncertain outcomes in the future (De Bondt & Thaler 1995). 
The TMT members may be subjected to different levels of overconfidence about the firm’s 
prospect, implying a belief dispersion, which leads to a disagreement among top executives. 
As TMT members are the key decision-makers of firms, such disagreement within TMT is 
likely to yield a significant impact on the decision-making processes of corporate innovation. 
For example, overconfident managers who overestimate the returns of innovative investments 
are prone to invest in these risky projects (Galasso & Simcoe 2011; Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 
2012; Malmendier & Tate 2005). However, the likelihood of innovation success is low. 
Therefore, less optimistic members of the TMTs may disagree with the decisions proposed by 
overconfident executives.  
The effectiveness of innovation activities depends on the quality of TMTs’ decisions. 
Prior literature provides mixed views about group dissent on the quality of group decisions 
(e.g., Bénabou 2013; De Dreu & Weingart 2003). In this case, the dissent induced by belief 
dispersion within the TMT members can increase or decrease the efficiency of corporate 
innovation investment. On the one hand, from the bright-side perspective, disagreement within 
the TMTs can help reduce the biases in group decision-making processes. First, group members’ 
biases can “cancel out each other” by negotiations (Landier, Sraer & Thesmar 2009). Less bias 
in the decision processes then yields better innovation outcomes. Second, the disagreement can 
restrain the social conformity biases (Asch 1956; Asch & Guetzkow 1951), which is also 
known as “groupthink” (Janis 1972). Prior research documents that disagreement may help to 
resist social conformity pressure (Asch 1955; Nemeth & Chiles 1988). This strand of the 
literature suggests that dissent can increase an individual’s courage to be an independent 
thinker. When there is a group dissent, executives will be concerned that their private and 
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public judgment coincide (Nemeth & Chiles 1988). Thus, disagreement promotes independent 
thinking and against social conformity biases, which also results in better idea creation and 
innovation outcomes.  
Furthermore, dissent in TMTs can encourage knowledge and information sharing 
among the TMT members. Dispersed beliefs could also reflect different sources of information 
obtained by TMT members (Wiersema & Bantel 1992). When there are dissents or different 
preferences among the TMT members (Che & Kartik 2009; Malenko 2014; Parks & Nelson 
1999), each executive can access other sources of information through discussion (Che & 
Kartik 2009; Malenko 2014; Parks & Nelson 1999). As a result, a broader knowledge base for 
decision making will be arrived, contributing to the quality of TMTs’ innovation decisions.   
The positive effect of belief dispersion on firm innovation can also be transmitted to 
the subordinators (Stewart 2003). For example, the employees, especially those from the R&D 
department, may put more effort into innovation projects because they understand the decision-
making process being less arbitrary (Landier, Sraer & Thesmar 2009). Second, management 
disagreement can create a problem-solving culture within the firm. It encourages employees to 
propose different opinions and fosters creative thinking (Nemeth, Brown & Rogers 2001). 
Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: Belief dispersion within TMTs increases firm innovation efficiency.  
Since bias reduction and information-sharing are the fundamental driving forces of the 
positive effect of belief dispersion on innovation, I also predict that the positive impact of TMT 
belief dispersion should be more pronounced when information-sharing and group discussion 
can mitigate the inefficiency induced by CEO’s biased perception. For example, overconfident 
CEOs may overestimate the return of innovative investment and underestimate the related risk 
(Galasso & Simcoe 2011; Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 2012). In this case, high belief dispersion 
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within the TMTs can reduce the biased perception held by overconfident CEOs through group 
discussion and information-sharing about the innovation project selection, thereby improving 
the efficiency of innovation. Accordingly, I hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 1a: The positive effect of belief dispersion within TMTs on firm innovation 
efficiency is more pronounced for firms that are managed by overconfident CEOs.  
Next, many large corporations have created a senior management position with the 
responsibility of taking care of the technology-related business, usually named as the Chief 
Technology Officer (CTO). They serve as technical experts within TMTs and play an important 
role in distributing the complex innovation information to the team members (Adler & Ferdows 
1990). CTOs can facilitate tech-related communication during the group discussions process, 
and thus improve the innovative information sharing. Therefore, I also hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1B: The positive effect of TMT belief dispersion on firm innovation efficiency is 
more pronounced for firms with CTOs. 
Further, I also predict the benefit of belief dispersion and information-sharing depends 
on the firm’s industry environment. The innovation activity and efficiency are more crucial for 
firms operating in the high-tech industries, as it determines the survival and long-term prospect 
of these firms (Suzuki & Kodama 2004). A diverse belief and discussion within the TMT 
members can improve the quality of selected innovation projects (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). 
Accordingly, I hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 1C: The positive effect of TMT belief dispersion on firm innovation efficiency is 
more pronounced for firms operating in the high-tech industries.  
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4. Data, Methodology, and Variables  
4.1. Sample selection  
The initial sample consists of all U.S. listed firms during the periods from 1992 to 2010.  
I exclude financial firms (SIC code: 6000 – 6999) and utility firms (SIC code: 4900-4999) 
because of their regulatory nature.  I require firms to have accounting data from Compustat, 
executive compensation data from the Compustat ExecuComp database, stock price 
information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and patent-related 
information from Kogan et al. (2017) patent database. Following the literature (Bebchuk, 
Cremers & Peyer 2011; Bushman, Dai & Zhang 2016), I remove the firms that have reported 
less than five executives’ compensation data in given years. If a firm has reported more than 
five executives’ information, only the top five highest-paid executives’ information is used. 
The final sample ends up with 9,098 firm-year observations.  
4.2 Baseline regression specification and variable measurement   
The purpose of the analysis in this section is twofold. First, it illustrates the econometric 
models that are used in empirical tests. Second, it explains why the variables are employed in 
empirical tests and how they are calculated. 
The main objective of this paper is to examine the effect of TMT belief dispersion on a 
firm’s innovation efficiency. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is employed to serve 
this objective. I also control for other important determinants of innovation and include year-
fixed and industry-fixed effects to control for unobservable time and industry factors that may 
affect firm innovation. The reason for controlling industry-fixed effects is because of its 
significant explanatory power toward innovation. Cohen, Levin and Mowery (1987) document 
that industry-related factors can explain around 50% of the variance in R&D intensity, while 
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the business unit only explains less than 1% of the variance. Thus, the baseline regression is 
designed as: 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+𝑛
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 + 𝑖,𝑡      (1) 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+𝑛  is the dependent variable, which measures a firm’s 
innovation performance from year t+1 to t+5. 𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡  is the key independent variable that 
measures the belief dispersion within TMTs. 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 contains a set of controls, while 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 and 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 are the two controls for year-fixed and industry-fixed effects. 𝛼 is the intercept, 
and 𝑖,𝑡 is the error term.  
There are three measures for a firm’s innovation performance in this study. These 
variables are: (1) the patent count; (2) the patent citation; (3) the patent economic value. Patent-
related data is from Kogan et al. (2017). This dataset contains information about patents granted 
by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1926 to 2010. It also provides detailed 
information about each patent (see Kogan et al. 2017 for more details). Based on this database, 
I construct the three measures of a firm’s innovation outcome in the following way.  
The patent count is the total number of patents that are applied by a firm in a given 
fiscal year. This proxy gauges the productivity of a firm’s innovation activity. However, it 
cannot reflect the success of these activities because each patent has different importance 
regarding the scientific value and economic value (Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 2012). Hence, I 
employ the patent citation and the patent economic value as two additional measures. The 
patent citation is the total number of forwarding citations received by each patent. It measures 
the impact of each patent in the field of science. The patent economic value is an estimated 
value from the stock market reaction to the news about each patent (see more detailed in Kogan 
et al. 2017). Furthermore, I aggregate the innovation measures to firms by each patent’s 
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application year. The reason for using this time placer is because it can capture the actual time 
of innovation precisely (Griliches, Pakes & Hall 1986; He & Tian 2013). I also only include 
those eventually granted patents when measuring a firm’s innovation performance to minimize 
the survivorship bias (He & Tian 2013).  
Some data problems in the innovation measures, such as missing value and the right 
skewness, may affect the results. Following the innovation literature (He & Tian 2013; 
Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 2012; Shen & Zhang 2018), I minimize the influence of these 
problems by taking some data transformation. Firstly, firm-year observations with missing 
value in the innovation proxies are assigned a zero value. Next, I apply the natural logarithm 
transformation to handle the right skewness. Specifically, I add one to the actual value of the 
innovation measures and then take the natural logarithm of them. The reason for that is to avoid 
losing observations with zero value in the innovation measures. Lastly, these variables are 
winsorized at 1% level.  
The coefficient 𝛽1 is the main interest of this study as it measures the effect of TMT’s 
belief dispersion on innovation outcomes. Hypothesis 1 predicts𝛽1 to be positive. That is, the 
higher the TMT belief dispersion, the higher the effectiveness in the firm’s innovation activities. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that higher TMT belief dispersion leads to lower efficiency 
of firm innovation. Thus, it is a critical empirical question to examine whether belief dispersion 
is beneficial or detrimental from empirical tests. 
𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is a TMT-based measure. In the setting of this study, each TMT contains five top-
paid executives for a firm-year observation. Also, all the members of a TMT are required to 
have vested stock options on hand, and at least one of these options is in the money. Based on 
these selected TMTs, 𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is calculated by the standard deviation of each executive’s 
confidence levels within a TMT. Prior literature on CEO overconfidence suggests that stock 
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option exercising behaviour can show executives’ confidence levels in their firm’s performance 
(Campbell et al. 2011; Humphery-Jenner et al. 2016; Malmendier & Tate 2005). Following 
these prior studies, I use the confidence levels of each executive to proxy their beliefs in the 
firm they manage. To be specific, I compute the confidence levels as:  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 
where, 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑿𝑖,𝑡 denotes a vector of other explanatory variables that are suggested by prior literature 
(e.g., Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 2012). It includes the controls for firm-specified factors, stock 
market performance, and CEO characteristics.  
Each firm-level characteristic is computed as the following: firm size is the natural 
logarithm of one plus annual sales of a firm scaled by its total book asset; capital intensity is 
the natural logarithm of a firm’s net property, plant, and equipment over the number of its 
employees; institutional holdings is the ratio of the shares held by intuitional investors to the 
number of outstanding shares; leverage is the sum of a firm’s debt scaled by its total book asset; 
the cost of innovation activities is the natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s R&D expenditure 
scaled by its total book asset. Following the literature (e.g., Hirshleifer, Hsu & Li 2013), any 
missing R&D value is assigned to 0.  
Many previous studies have documented the important impact of these firm-specific 
factors on innovations. The classic hypothesis between firm size and innovation suggests that 
large firms can generate more technological advantages than small firms (Schumpeter 2010). 
Also, Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2013) document that higher institutional ownership 
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is associated with more innovative activities in publicly traded firms. Next, Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001) illustrate that capital-intensive firms are prone to innovative investment. Furthermore, 
leverage is likely to impact innovation by affecting each firm’s availability of investment funds 
and stability of operation. Lastly, controlling the cost of each firm’s innovation activities is 
required by the objectives of this study. This research aims to discover the determinants of 
firms’ innovation efficiency. Using output-oriented innovation measures alone cannot serve 
this purpose. Inspired by Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) and He and Tian (2013), I control 
for firms’ R&D expenditure in year t to consider the input of firms’ innovation activities. Thus, 
the innovation outputs in each firm can show the effectiveness of those innovative activities. 
I also include the controls for past stock price performance to address a potentially 
spurious relationship between the primary dependent variable and innovation activities. The 
measure of belief dispersion used in this study is based on the confidence levels of each top 
executive, estimated by their option holding profiles. However, this measure of confidence may 
associate with the past stock returns (Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 2012). High returns can increase 
the moneyness of stock options, which is perceived as high individual confidence levels. Hence, 
in addition to reflecting executives’ beliefs in their firm, the measure may reflect stock price 
performance consequent to the option grant date. This conjecture implies a potential error in 
the results of this study if better stock performance is also associated with more firm innovation. 
Following the literature (Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 2012; Malmendier & Tate 2015), I address 
this concern by adding two controls to all regression models. The first one is the past 12 months’ 
buy-and-hold stock return before the ending fiscal month of each firm. I also adjust this 
measure yearly by the industry median value of stock return to mitigate the industry effects on 
a firm’s stock performance, based on the firm’s two-digit SIC code. The second one is the 
volatility of the stock returns over the past 5 fiscal years.  
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Given that the CEO bears responsibility for the entire firm (Shen & Zhang 2018), I also 
take into account some CEO characteristics in this study. Sheikh (2012) finds that CEO delta 
is positively related to investment in innovative projects. Regarding CEO vega, it provides the 
incentives to take risky investment (Coles, Daniel & Naveen 2006), which can also relate to 
innovative investment. I obtain the data for CEO delta and CEO vega from Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2006). In their study, the two variables are calculated as the dollar change in the CEO’s 
wealth in respective to a 1% change in stock price (CEO delta), and 1% change in the standard 
deviation of stock return (CEO vega). Moreover, CEO tenure may also relate to firm innovation, 
as it can affect the level of risk aversion associated with CEOs. Berger, Ofek and Yermack 
(1997) argue that CEOs with longer tenures and high cash compensation are likely to be 
entrenched and will seek to avoid risk. I compute CEO tenure as the natural logarithm of one 
plus the number of years since an executive became the CEO. Lastly, Hirshleifer, Low and 
Teoh (2012) have documented that overconfident CEOs are prone to innovative investment. I 
also control for the effects of CEO overconfidence in this study. Due to the lack of detailed 
data about CEO holding options, I use the method in Campbell et al. (2011) to compute the 
dummy indicator for CEO overconfidence. It equals to 1 if a CEO has least held over 67% in-
the-money options twice during the sample periods. 
4.3 Econometric model to solve the endogeneity problems 
Although many factors have been considered in the baseline regression model (1), 
endogeneity still may be a concern. In this section, I explain where the endogeneity concerns 
may arise from and what identification strategies have been used to mitigate these concerns.  
There may be some firm-specific characteristics that can influence both innovation and 
TMT’s belief dispersion in firms. This argument suggests that the belief dispersion is 
endogenous. Also, successful innovation is likely to provide a positive signal to each executive 
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about their skill and ability, which can enhance their optimism (Camerer & Lovallo 1999). 
However, the enhancement may be different regarding each individual. This causality suggests 
a plausible feedback effect (i.e., reverse causality) from successful innovation performance to 
TMT’s belief dispersion.  
To mitigate the endogeneity concerns, I first investigate the lead-lag relation between 
the dependent and the independent variables in the baseline model (1). Specifically, all the 
explanatory variables are at least lagged 1-year in relation to the measures of innovation 
outcomes. Second, I employ three different identification strategies in this research to further 
address the endogeneity problem.  
The first strategy relies on the events of executive turnover. TMT’s belief dispersion is 
a team-based behavioral trait. Such behavioral trait may be different when the member of 
TMTs has been replaced. Thus, the events of executive transition provide a window to identify 
the relationship between TMT’s belief dispersion and firm’s innovation efficiency. If TMT’s 
belief dispersion indeed yields better innovation efficiency, it should be discovered when the 
dispersion increases mainly due to a new joining executive.  
Based on the above idea, I start by examining executive turnover events in the sample. 
When the executive leaves the current firm and joins a new company, we define the first year 
of the executive is reported by the new company as the turnover happening year. I further 
require that this executive is not joining other companies in the following year. Any turnover 
events that cannot satisfy this requirement is excluded.  
Next, turnover-related firms are divided into two groups: the treatment and the control. 
The treatment group consists of the firms with increased TMT’s belief dispersion due to a new 
joining executive. Firstly, I calculate the five-year average of each TMT’s belief dispersion in 
pre- and post- turnover periods for the turnover-related firms. Secondly, I calculate the 
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increasing rate by using the post-turnover average minus the pre-turnover average. Lastly, I 
select the firms with the top 25% of the increasing rate as the treatment group, and the 
remaining firms belong to the control group.  
Further, I perform a propensity score matching (PSM) approach by including all other 
control variables in the baseline model (1). This matching process ensures that the treatment 
and the control groups are similar in terms of other important determinants of innovation. The 
final matched sample consists of 207 pairs of treatment-control observations. With this sample, 
I run the following regression using the matched sample:  
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+3/𝑡+4/𝑡+5
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 + 𝑖,𝑡       (2) 
𝛼 is the intercept and 𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. Since firm’s innovation results take a long 
time to resolve (Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 2012), we examine the innovation outcomes at 3 
years and 5 years after the executive joining the company. Treat is the dummy indicator, which 
is equal to 1 for the treatment group and 0 for the control. I also include, 𝑿𝑖,𝑡, the same set of 
controls as the baseline model. This regression model also includes year-fixed effects and 
industry-fixed effects to account for the time- and industry- invariant factors. If an increasing 
in belief dispersion improves the innovation efficiency, the estimated coefficient on the dummy 
variable (Treat) is expected to be positive.  
The second identification strategy is using the burst of dot-com bubble as an exogenous 
shock to TMTs’ belief dispersion. During the periods of 1999 to early 2000, there are many 
initial public offerings (IPOs) from the dot-com related industries. More importantly, the first-
day returns on these IPOs are incredibly high. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr. (2003) emphasize 
the fact that the first-day returns are around 73 percent in 1999 but only be 17 percent in 1996. 
Since personal life experience may affect personal belief (Malmendier, Tate & Yan 2011), the 
31 
 
booming and the burst dot-com bubble around 1999 provide an exogenous variation in the life 
experience of executives from the dot-com related industries and thus affect the TMTs’ belief 
dispersion. A firm’s executives could learn from the failures of their peers and change their 
beliefs, which can reduce the dispersion of the TMTs caused by the unrealistic beliefs of the 
TMT members. Secondly, the market crisis may require quicker responses to gain competitive 
advantages (Hambrick, Cho & Chen 1996). Such requirement further induces homogenous 
belief among the firm’s top managers to generate quicker management consensus. 
Internet firms are more likely to be affected by the burst of dot-com bubble. Thus, I 
define the treatment group and control group based on the value of TMT’s belief dispersion of 
Internet firms in 1999 right before the burst of dot-com bubble. The Internet firms with top 50% 
high belief dispersion in the TMTs are considered as the treatment firms. The other Internet 
firms and firms in other industries are defined as control firms. Next, I use the difference in 
difference (DiD) approach to address the endogeneity issues in the baseline regression (1). The 
DID regression takes the following form:  
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽3 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝑿𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                                 (3) 
𝛼 and 𝑖,𝑡 are the intercept and the disturbance term, respectively. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is the dummy 
indicator to distinguish the treatment and control firms. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a time indicator, which equal 
to 1 for the period from 2000 to 2002 and 0 otherwise. I also include the same set of controls 
as the baseline. This model also includes industry-fixed effects. 𝛽3 is expected to be negative 
because of the decreasing in TMTs’ belief dispersion of the treatment group after the burst of 
dot-com bubble.  
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The last identification strategy relies on an instrumental variable (IV) with a two-stage 
least square (2SLS) regression (Wooldridge 2016). I use the industry median level of TMT’s 
belief dispersion in a given year as an instrument variable. This IV is likely to satisfy both 
relevance and exclusion restrictions for a valid IV. Firstly, it is likely that the firms in the same 
industry are having similar recruitment policies, which can lead to similar TMT’s belief 
dispersion in those firms. Secondly, it is unlikely that a firm’s innovation efficiency can be 
affected by the industry-level of TMT’s belief dispersion.  
I calculate the instrumental variable for each firm-year observation based on their 
industry classification, and then run the 2SLS regressions shown as below:  
First stage:  
𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡
. =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝐵𝐷(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸
+ 𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                         (4) 
Second stage:  
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝑛
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡
.̂ + 𝛿𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 + 𝑖,𝑡      (5) 
From model (4), the significance of the estimated coefficient on 
𝐵𝐷(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 can indicate whether the IV is satisfying the relevance condition. 
Also, the F-statistic from the model (4) can show whether the relationship between the IV and 
the endogenous variable is strong or weak (Staiger & Stock 1994; Stock & Yogo 2002). In the 
second stage regression, the coefficient on 𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡
.̂  is also expected to be significantly positive.  
 
4.4. Summary statistics  
[Insert Table 1] 
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the final sample. On average, each firm applies 
25 patents per year. Concerning the quality, these patents on average would receive 216 
forward citations and worth $544 million. However, there are some extreme values in these 
innovation measures, which is shown by the maximum value of each variable. Thus, I use the 
logarithm transformation of these variables to mitigate the effect of outliers. On average, belief 
dispersion within TMTs is 0.31. The median value and standard deviation of belief dispersion 
are 0.15 and 0.46, respectively.  
Table 1 also shows the descriptive statistics of CEO and firm characteristics. 73% of 
CEOs are defined as overconfident CEOs, and CEO tenure on average is 7 years. The mean of 
CEO delta and CEO vega equal to $0.55 million and $0.14 million, respectively. Regarding 
other variables, an average firm has annual sales of $5.5 billion, PPE per employee of $289.31 
thousand, leverage of 22%, the pay gap between CEO and the next layer of senior executives 
of $6.46 thousand, and R&D expenditure of $0.04 million. Moreover, on average, 58% of the 
firm’s share is held by institutional investors, and the annual return and the annual return 
volatility of the share are 13% and 41%, respectively4. 
[Insert Table 2] 
The correlation matrix of the key variables is reported in table 2 panel A and B.  Panel 
A shows that belief dispersion is negatively related to firm size, capital intensity, and leverage 
ratio, but it is positively related to past stock performance, past stock return volatility, and R&D 
expenditure. Panel B indicates that some CEO characteristics are related to belief dispersion. 
CEOs being overconfident, having long tenure or high delta is likely to link with high belief 
                                                          
4 The summary statistics that are shown in Table 1 are mostly consistent with previous literature (e.g., Hirshleifer, 
Low & Teoh 2012; Shen & Zhang 2018) 
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dispersion. In contrast, having high CEO vega is negatively related to the levels of the 
dispersion.  
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5. Main results  
5.1. Baseline Results  
[Insert Table 3] 
Table 3 shows the regression results for empirical analysis by taking the baseline model 
(1). The primary independent variable is Dispersion, and the dependent variable is innovation 
output. There are three different innovation output measures, and each of them is calculated 
from year t+1 to year t+5 to account for the implementing time of any innovation policy. In 
Panel A, the dependent variables are Ln(1+citation count) for Column 1-5 and Ln(1+patent 
value) for Column 6-10. These two measures aim to capture the scientific and economic 
importance of corporate innovation output. They focus on the impact of belief dispersion on 
innovation quality. The dependent variable is Ln(1+patent count) for all regressions in Panel 
B. This variable shows a firm’s overall innovation productivity. Therefore, the regression 
results indicate how belief dispersion can affect corporate innovation in quantity. Further, all 
the regressions have controlled for R&D expenditure. In this case, the estimated coefficients 
of belief dispersion present their influence on a firm’s innovation efficiency. I also cluster 
standard errors at the firm. 
The results in Table 3 are consistent with the main hypothesis. The coefficients of 
Dispersion are positive and significant at 1% or 5% level across all regressions in Panel A of 
Table 3. These findings support the argument that belief dispersion can contribute to a firm’s 
efficiency in producing higher-impact patents. Regarding the economic significance, from the 
results in columns 1 and 3 of Panel A, one standard deviation increase in Dispersion can raise 
citation count by 5.24% in year t+1 and 6.99% in year t+3. Similarly, from columns 6 and 8 of 
Panel A, patent value would be increased by 7.25% in year t+1 and 9.15% in year t+3 if 
dispersion is increased by one standard deviation. These increases are economically significant. 
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According to the sample average, the increase in future one year citations is about 11 and 
$39.58 million in patent value. However, the coefficients of Dispersion are all insignificant for 
the regressions at Panel B of Table 3, which means belief dispersion is not related to the 
quantity of corporate innovation.  
In sum, the findings in panel A and B of Table 3 are more consistent with the expected 
effects of belief dispersion, which include reducing the biases in group decision-making 
processes and sharing knowledge among TMTs’ members. From these two channels, belief 
dispersion is likely to yield high-quality innovation, not a large quantity of innovation, thereby 
affecting the efficiency of generating high-cited and high-value patents.  
The estimated coefficients of the control variables in Table 3 are consistent with 
existing literature (e.g., He & Tian 2013; Hirshleifer, Hsu & Li 2013; Shen & Zhang 2018). 
For example, the coefficients on Ln(1+Sale), Ln(1+PPE/EMP), and Ln(1+R&D exp.) are 
positive and significant, which indicate that a firm is likely to be innovation efficient if it is 
large, with more tangible assets, or spending more on R&D. Further, institutional ownership, 
tournament incentives in TMTs (Ln (Pay Gap)), and past stock return volatility are positively 
related to corporate innovation efficiency. Increasing in debt financing will reduce the 
effectiveness of corporate innovation, supported by the negative and significant coefficients of 
Leverage.  
Although Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) and Galasso and Simcoe (2011) find 
positively significant effects of CEO overconfidence on corporate innovation, I cannot find a 
similar result. The coefficients on CEO overconfidence are insignificant. The setting of this 
study may explain the inconsistency. By applying a team concept, this study considers not only 
CEOs’ but also other TMT members’ behavior biases, which shows the importance of viewing 
top executives jointly as a team, rather than focusing on one single agent (i.e., CEOs). Other 
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CEO characteristics, such as CEO tenure and CEO delta, show an insignificant impact on firms’ 
innovation efficiency. Only CEO vega appears to have a positive influence. It is not surprising 
that CEO risk-taking incentives are related to one of the risky corporate investments, i.e., 
innovation.  
5.2. Robustness  
So far, the results from the baseline regression (1) are consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
However, there are potential endogeneity concerns, as discussed in section 3.3. These concerns 
can prevent the current study to draw a causal relationship between belief dispersion and 
corporate innovation efficiency. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, I have performed three 
additional tests and the results are presented in the following subsection.  
5.2.1 The effects of belief dispersion around executive turnovers  
[Insert Table 4] 
The first identification approach relies on the events of executive turnover. Firms that 
have a sharp increase in belief dispersion after executive turnovers are defined as treatment 
firms. This increase is likely due to the change of their TMT members, rather than firm-specific 
factors. Thus, the result from this approach can mitigate the omitted variable bias. If consistent 
with the main result in OLS estimation, treatment firms should present better innovation 
performance than control firms because of the significant increase in belief dispersion.  
Table 4 reports the results. Panel A presents that there is a significant difference 
between the treatment and the control in the change of belief dispersion after executive 
turnovers. On average, the change is 0.31 (in Column 1) for treatment firms, and it is -0.32 (in 
Column 2) for control firms. The difference in differences on average is 0.628, and it is 
significant at 1% level (in Column 3). Panel B shows the regression results on a matched 
sample. The controls in this regression are the same as the baseline model. The matched sample 
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is created by a PSM approach5. Since the corporate innovation activities need more than one 
year to generate the outcomes, the dependent variables are calculated at three- to five-year after 
executive transition events. Treat is a dummy indicator, which equals to 1 for treatment firms 
and 0 for control firms. The difference between the treatment and the control group is the 
change in TMT belief dispersion, caused by executive turnovers. In Panel B of Table 4, the 
coefficients of Treat are all positive and significant. This result indicates that exogenous 
increases in belief dispersion indeed yield higher innovation efficiencies, suggesting a positive 
relationship between belief dispersion and corporate innovation efficiency.  
5.2.2 DiD approach  
The second identification strategy is to rely on a natural experiment. The dot-com 
bubble burst around 1999 is employed as an exogenous shock. As explained in Section 3.3, 
this shock is suitable for identification purposes. It generates some exogenous variations in the 
belief dispersion of treatment firms. Internet firms with high dispersion before the burst of dot-
com bubble are defined as the treatment firms, and the other in the sample are selected as the 
control. The pre- and the post-bubble periods are 1996 to 1998 and 2000 to 2002, respectively. 
Therefore, Treat indicator equals 1 for treatment firms and 0 for control firms. Post equals 1 
for post-bubble period and 0 otherwise. 
Before starting the DiD analysis, I check whether the parallel trend assumption is 
satisfied. Figure 1 provides the first piece of evidence that the parallel trend assumption is 
satisfied. Panels A-C shows the patterns of different innovation measures for the two groups 
of firms over a seven-year event window [-3, +3]. Overall, the differences between the two 
groups are similar before the exogenous shock. In addition, panel B of Table 5 shows that the 
coefficients of Treat are statistically insignificant. This result indicates that there is no 
                                                          
5 I include all other control variables in the baseline model as the matching variables. 
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statistical difference in innovation efficiency between the treatment and the control group, 
suggesting that the parallel trend assumption is satisfied.  
[Insert Figure 1 & Table 5] 
Table 5 provides the main results from the DiD analysis. Panel A shows the mean 
difference (after-before) in belief dispersion for the treatment and the control. The mean 
difference is -0.463 for treatment firms (in Column 1) and -0.098 for control firms (in Column 
2). Column 3 shows the difference in differences, which is -0.364 and significant at 1% level. 
Thus, there is a more significant decrease in belief dispersion in treatment firms than control 
firms, surrounding the event of the dot-com bubble burst.  
Further, Panel B of Table 5 presents the results from three DiD regressions. The 
coefficients of Post are negative and significant. This result indicates that the burst of the dot-
com bubble causes a significant decrease in firms’ innovation efficiency. The critical variable 
for identification purposes is the interaction between the two dummy variables, Treat*Post. 
The estimated coefficient of this variable is negative and significant. This result suggests that 
the decrease in innovation efficiency in treatment firms is more substantial than in control firms. 
Thus, the DiD estimation yields a consistent result as the main regression, supporting 
hypothesis 1, that is, the higher the dispersion, the better corporate innovation efficiency. 
5.2.3. Instrumental Variable Approach 
The last identification strategy is to use a 2SLS regression. In a similar spirit with Shen 
and Zhang (2018), I use the lagged industry-level median dispersion as an instrument variable. 
This instrument is likely to be valid, that is, correlated with the endogenous variable and not 
directly related to the dependent variable. The results from the first-stage regression show the 
satisfaction of the relevance requirement. However, the satisfaction of the exclusion restriction 
cannot be directly tested. I find no prior study that has indicated a direct link between an 
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industry-level dispersion and firm-level innovative performance. Thus, the IV is likely to 
satisfy the requirement of exclusion.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Table 6 presents the 2SLS regression results. The first column in each panel shows the 
first-stage regression results. In the first stage, I regress dispersion on the IV, Industry median 
dispersion, and all other control variables in the second-stage regression. Consistent with the 
expectation, the coefficient of the IV is significant at 1% level. This result suggests a strong 
relevance between the IV and the endogenous variable. Also, the IV is not a weak-instrument 
according to the F-statistic from the first-stage regression. The F-statistic is greater than 10, 
which will reject the null hypothesis that the IV is weak (Staiger & Stock 1994).  
In the first-stage regression, the estimated coefficients of CEO characteristics are 
statistically significant. CEO overconfidence and CEO delta are positively related to belief 
dispersion, while CEO tenure and CEO vega are negatively related to it. This result confirms 
the argument from many previous studies (e.g. Shen & Zhang 2018), that is, CEOs, as the 
leader of TMTs, having a notable influence on TMTs’ characteristics. Furthermore, higher 
belief dispersion is likely to be observed at larger firms, firms with higher leverage and with 
higher R&D expenditure. Larger belief dispersion is also more likely to exist at firms with 
better past stock performance, higher past stock return volatility, and greater CEO pay gap.  
Other columns in each panel of Table 6 report the results from the second-stage 
regressions. Specifically, the regressions in Panel A and B use Ln(1+citation) and Ln(1+value) 
as the dependent variable, respectively. In Panel C, the dependent variable is Ln(1+patent). 
Consistent with the findings from the baseline model, the coefficients of instrumented 
Dispersion are mostly positive and significant in year t+3 to t+5, but they are positive and 
insignificant in year t+1 and t+2.  
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In summary, according to different identification strategies, the results are consistent 
with those from the baseline model, which suggests that there is a positive causal relationship 
between belief dispersion and firm innovation efficiency.  
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6. Subsample analysis 
In this section, I further examine whether the positive effect of belief dispersion on 
innovation efficiency varies across firms with different characteristics. According to 
hypotheses 1A-1C, if information sharing is the underlying channel, such a positive effect 
should be more pronounced when the value of information is greater. To test this conjecture, I 
perform three different subsample analysis and present the results in table 7.  
[Insert Table 7] 
The first subsample analysis is based on whether or not a firm is managed by an 
overconfident CEO. Overconfident CEOs are prone to invest in innovative projects (Galasso 
& Simcoe 2011; Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh 2012). These typical CEOs are likely to discuss more 
innovation with other the TMTs’ members, which contributes to setting up an environment 
with more significant initiative of innovation. Columns 1-3 of Table 7 report the results of the 
first subsample analysis. The coefficients on the interaction variable, CEO overconfidence * 
Dispersion, are all positive and statistically significant. This result supports the hypothesis 1A; 
the positive relationship between belief dispersion and corporate innovation efficiency should 
be more pronounced when CEOs are overconfident.  
The second subsample analysis is based on the composition of TMTs. The CTO sitting 
in a TMT facilitates innovative information sharing among the team, and thus a more 
pronounced positive effect of belief dispersion on innovation efficiency should be found. I 
identify CTOs according to executives’ annual title. An executive is a CTO if he or she annual 
title contains the words “tech.”, “technology”, or “technical”. There are 977 CTOs in the 
sample. The CTO indicator equals to 1 for the TMTs with a CTO member, and 0 otherwise. 
Then, I estimate the baseline model with two additional variables, the CTO indicator and the 
interaction variable between CTO and belief dispersion. Columns 4-6 of Table 7 show the 
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result. The coefficients of the interaction variable are positive and significant. This result 
supports hypothesis 1B, suggesting that the positive effect of belief dispersion on innovation 
efficiency is stronger when firms have a CTO in their TMTs.  
The last subsample analysis examines the positive effect of belief dispersion across 
different industries. To be survived in an innovative industry, firms are required to produce a 
steady stream of innovations. Thus, the positive effect of belief dispersion on corporate 
innovation efficiency is expected to be stronger for those firms. The classification of the 
innovative industry follows Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr. (2003), which uses a firm’s four-digit 
SIC code. I generate an indicator, HT, which equals 1 for firms belong to the innovative 
industry, and 0 otherwise. Next, I estimate the baseline regression with two additional variables, 
the HT indicator and the interaction variable, HT*Dispersion. Columns 7-9 of Table 7 shows 
the results. In all these columns, the coefficients of the interaction term are all positive and 
significant, supporting Hypothesis 1C.  
The results from subsample analysis show that the effect of belief dispersion on firm 
innovation efficiency is more pronounced in the firms with an information-sharing 
environment. This result implies that such a positive effect from belief dispersion is likely 
through the channel of information sharing.  
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7. Firm Performance Implication 
Since innovation is the engine of firm growth, better efficiency in innovative 
investments may yield higher firm performance. Thus, I test the effect of the dispersion on firm 
performance and show the results in this section. Specifically, I estimate the same regression 
as the baseline model but replace the dependent variable by two measures of firm performance. 
The two measures are Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA), which are standard measures of 
firm performance that can be found in previous studies (e.g., Bushman, Dai & Zhang 2016). 
[Insert Table 8] 
Table 8 shows the results. Both regressions in columns 1-2 find a positive coefficient 
of Dispersion, and it is statistically significant at 1% level. This positive effect of belief 
dispersion on firm performance is economically significant. One standard deviation increase 
in the belief dispersion will yield a 6.85% increase for Tobin’s Q and an 18.17% increase for 
the ROA from the sample mean. Moreover, previous studies have documented that the board 
is an important determinant of firm performance. For example, Guest (2009) finds that board 
size is negatively related to firm performance among UK listed firms. Liu et al. (2015) show 
that board independence has a positive impact on Chinese firms’ performance. Therefore, in 
Columns 3-4, I add board size and board independence to the set of controls. The estimated 
coefficients of Dispersion are still positive and statistically significant at 1% level after 
controlling for board information.  
However, endogeneity issue is still a concern. It is likely to exist an omitted variable 
that can affect both belief dispersion and firm performance. For example, some firms may 
encourage employees to hold different opinions. This corporate culture may also foster creative 
thinking and then lead to better performance. Thereby, belief dispersion is an endogenous 
variable, and the result of the OLS regression is biased. I first mitigate endogeneous concerns 
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by estimating the OLS regressions with firm-fixed effects. This method may remove the biases 
from time-invariant omitted firm characteristics (e.g., corporate culture). Second, I construct 
an instrument for belief dispersion (the industry median value of belief dispersion) and use a 
2SLS approach to correct for the potential bias.  
[Insert Table 9] 
Panel A of Table 9 shows the regression results with firm-fixed effects. The dependent 
variable is Tobin’s Q in Column 1, and it is ROA in Column 2. The two regressions find 
positive and significant coefficients of Dispersion. This result suggests that the findings from 
OLS estimation are robust after controlling for time-invariant firm factors. Panel B of Table 9 
shows the result from 2SLS regressions. Column 1 presents the first-stage regression result. 
The coefficient of the IV is significant at 1% level, which indicates that the IV satisfies the 
relevance requirement. Also, the F-statistic from the first-stage regression exceeds the rule of 
thumb of a strong IV(i.e., F-statistic >10). Columns 2-3 present the results from the second-
stage regression. Column 2 reports the results with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable, while 
Column 3 shows the results on ROA. From both regressions, the coefficient estimates of 
Dispersion(instrumented) are positive and significant, reinforcing the findings from OLS 
regressions.  
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8. Limitation and Conclusion 
In this thesis, I examine the effect of TMTs belief distribution on firm innovation. The 
belief distribution is measured by the deviation of TMTs members’ belief about their firm’s 
future performance. The term, “Belief dispersion”, refers to having dispersed beliefs within a 
firm’s TMT.  The baseline results show a positive relationship between TMTs belief dispersion 
and corporate innovation efficiency. I further perform three robustness tests to consider 
potentially endogeneity in belief dispersion. The first test utilizes the events of the executive 
transition, and the second one uses the dotcom bubble as a quasi-natural experiment. I employ 
a 2SLS approach in the last test. The results from all three approaches are consistent with the 
baseline model. 
In the subsample analysis section, I test possible underlying mechanisms through which 
TMTs belief dispersion can enhance corporate innovative efficiency. I find a more evident 
effect of TMTs belief dispersion on innovation for the firms with overconfident CEOs or a 
CTO in the TMT, and the firms from high-tech industries. This result is consistent with the 
view that belief dispersion encourages information sharing within TMTs and thus leads to 
better innovation efficiency. I further provide implications about the relation of TMTs belief 
dispersion and firm performance in the last section of this thesis. Both results from baseline 
regression and robustness tests indicate that TMTs belief dispersion is positively related to 
firms’ Tobin’s Q and ROA. Thus, shareholders indeed benefit from the belief dispersion within 
the TMT. 
My thesis contributes to three streams of literature. First, it identifies an important TMT 
attribute, belief dispersion, contributing to the literature of TMT. Second, it finds that TMTs 
belief dispersion is beneficial for innovation efficiency, contributing to the literature of 
corporate innovation. Finally, it sheds light on the interactional effect among the members of 
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a firm’s TMT, which is likely driven by each member’s behavioral bias, contributing to the 
literature of behavioral finance.  
I also acknowledge some limitations in this thesis. First, although my results suggest 
that belief dispersion within TMTs can enlarge the knowledge base in TMTs, such a relation 
cannot be tested directly as TMTs knowledge base is unobservable. Further, based on the 
current measure of TMTs belief dispersion, my study can only capture the belief of executives, 
who has a non-zero exercisable stock option. Future research could extend this measure by 
using texture analysis. Such method might provide a non-stock-based measure of TMTs belief 
dispersion. Finally, although the empirical results in my study show the benefit of belief 
dispersion, it does not exclude the alternative that belief dispersion may also have a dark-side 
effect on firm performance.  
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 Tables  
Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables that is used in the current study. The 
sample covers nonfinancial and nonutility firms in Execucomp from 1993 to 2010. After merging 
with Compustat, CRSP and Kogan et al. (2017) patent data, the final sample consists of 9,098 firm-
year observations. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% levels. 
       
VARIABLES Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
N patent 9,098 25.21 1.00 74.33 0.00 485.00 
Ln(1+patent) 9,098 1.35 0.69 1.73 0.00 6.19 
N Citation 9,098 215.95 0.00 750.93 0.00 5104.00 
Ln(1+citation) 9,098 1.92 0.00 2.56 0.00 8.54 
Patent Value 9,098 544.40 0.00 1932.99 0.00 12595.56 
Ln(1+value) 9,098 2.29 0.00 2.86 0.00 9.44 
Dispersion 9,098 0.31 0.15 0.46 0.00 2.86 
CEO 
Overconfidence 
9,098 0.73 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
CEO Tenure 9,098 7.36 5.00 7.10 0.00 35.00 
Ln(1+CEO 
Tenure) 
9,098 1.79 1.79 0.85 0.00 3.58 
CEO Delta 9,098 0.55 0.24 0.79 0.01 3.57 
Ln(1+ CEO Delta) 9,098 0.36 0.22 0.37 0.01 1.52 
CEO Vega 9,098 0.14 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.60 
Ln(1+CEO Vega) 9,098 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.47 
Sale  9,098 5535.12 1516.93 11030.49 23.06 65052.48 
Ln (1+Sale) 9,098 7.41 7.33 1.59 3.18 11.08 
PPE/EMP 9,098 289.31 87.07 818.73 7.02 6063.36 
Ln(PPE/emp) 9,098 4.65 4.48 1.16 2.08 8.71 
Leverage 9,098 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.00 3.47 
CEO paygap 9,098 6.46 6.47 1.18 3.29 9.17 
Ln(CEO paygap) 9,098 2.00 2.01 0.17 1.46 2.32 
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R&D exp.  9,098 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.30 
Ln (1+R&D exp.) 9,098 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.26 
Institutional 
ownership 
9,098 0.58 0.67 0.31 0.00 1.04 
Stock Return 9,098 0.13 0.07 0.44 -1.26 3.21 
Stock volatility 9,098 0.41 0.36 0.19 0.11 1.16 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
This table presents the correlation coefficient among the main variables of the study. Dispersion is the proxy for belief dispersion. It is calculated 
by taking the standard deviation of the confidence levels among a firm’s top-five executives. Individual confidence levels are calculated by 
following Campbell et al. (2011) overconfidence measure. Panel A reports the correlation coefficient among firm characteristics with belief 
dispersion. Panel B shows the correlation among CEO characteristics with belief dispersion. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix. ***, 
**, and * denote significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
Panel A. Correlations with firm characteristics (N= 9,098) 
 Dispersion Ln (1+sale) Ln(PPE/Emp) 
Institutional 
ownership 
Leverage 
Stock 
Return 
Stock 
volatility 
Ln 
(1+R&D 
exp.) 
Ln(CEO 
paygap) 
Dispersion 1.0000         
Ln (1+sale) -0.1333*** 1.0000        
Ln(PPE/Emp) -0.1035*** 0.0880*** 1.0000       
Institutional 
ownership 
-0.0098 0.0207** 0.0067 1.0000      
Leverage -0.1190*** 0.1791*** 0.1925*** -0.0559*** 1.0000     
Stock Return 0.1833*** -0.0790*** -0.0425*** -0.0191 -0.0264*** 1.0000    
Stock 
volatility 
0.1849*** -0.4954*** -0.0885*** 0.0052 -0.1194*** 0.1016*** 1.0000   
Ln (1+R&D 
exp.) 
0.0849*** -0.3378*** 0.0080 0.0486*** -0.2183*** 0.0758*** 0.3864*** 1.0000  
Ln(CEO 
paygap) 
-0.0058 0.5509*** 0.1143*** 0.1167*** 0.0779*** 0.0136 -0.1786*** -0.0456*** 1.0000 
 
Panel B. Correlations with CEO characteristics (N=9,098) 
 Dispersion CEO Overconfidence Ln(1+CEO Tenure) Ln(1+ CEO Delta) Ln(1+CEO Vega) 
Dispersion 1.0000     
CEO Overconfidence 0.1656*** 1.0000    
Ln(1+CEO Tenure) 0.0687*** 0.1165*** 1.0000   
Ln(1+ CEO Delta) 0.1686*** 0.2267*** 0.2875*** 1.0000  
Ln(1+CEO Vega) -0.0694** 0.1203** 0.0442** 0.6298** 1.0000 
59 
 
 
Table 3. The effect of belief dispersion to firm’s  innovative efficiency 
This table presents the baseline regressions of firm innovative efficiency on the belief dispersion within TMTs. The dependent variables are firm’s 
innovative outputs, which is calculated by citation count, patent value and patent count from year t+1 to year t+5. Also, innovative outcomes are 
aggregated at the application year of a patent for each firm-year observation. Following Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012), innovative efficiency is 
measured at innovative outcomes on a given levels of innovative inputs. Specifically, each regression of innovation outcome in future [t+1, t+5] has 
controlled for firm R&D expense in current. Dispersion is the standard deviation of the confidence levels among a firm’s top-five executives. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. All regressions control for the two-digit SIC code industry effect, and year effect. t-Statistics are calculated 
based on robust standard errors (within parentheses) and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.   
 
Panel A. Belief dispersion with citation count and patent value   
 
 Ln(1+Citation count) Ln(1+Patent value) 
VARIABLES t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Dispersion 0.114** 0.138** 0.152*** 0.148** 0.134** 0.158** 0.181*** 0.199*** 0.198*** 0.177** 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.063) (0.066) (0.069) (0.072) (0.073) (0.077) 
CEO 
Overconfidenc
e 
-0.027 -0.011 -0.005 0.037 0.004 0.027 0.063 0.084 0.149 0.111 
(0.083) (0.087) (0.090) (0.094) (0.097) (0.087) (0.094) (0.100) (0.106) (0.111) 
Ln(1+CEO 
Tenure) 
-0.017 0.003 0.020 0.032 0.038 -0.066* -0.042 -0.027 -0.000 0.005 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.043) (0.046) (0.048) 
Ln(1+ CEO 
Delta) 
-0.227 -0.231 -0.194 -0.195 -0.189 -0.086 -0.115 -0.152 -0.130 -0.074 
(0.145) (0.147) (0.147) (0.152) (0.151) (0.171) (0.178) (0.185) (0.196) (0.198) 
Ln(1+CEO 
Vega) 
1.041*** 0.837** 0.446 -0.017 -0.512 2.260*** 2.027*** 1.812*** 1.147** 0.332 
(0.391) (0.398) (0.398) (0.410) (0.422) (0.463) (0.482) (0.497) (0.525) (0.546) 
Ln (1+Sale) 0.640*** 0.653*** 0.641*** 0.651*** 0.649*** 0.907*** 0.934*** 0.936*** 0.959*** 0.964*** 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.056) 
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Ln(PPE/Emp) 0.190*** 0.180*** 0.155** 0.145** 0.129* 0.264*** 0.253*** 0.227*** 0.202** 0.181** 
(0.067) (0.069) (0.069) (0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.078) (0.079) (0.081) (0.087) 
Institutional 
ownership 
 
0.322** 0.371*** 0.377*** 0.340** 0.384*** 0.235 0.290* 0.335** 0.319* 0.372** 
(0.127) (0.128) (0.132) (0.138) (0.145) (0.150) (0.157) (0.162) (0.175) (0.185) 
Ln(pay gap) 0.435** 0.343 0.398* 0.514** 0.685*** 0.577** 0.472** 0.450* 0.591** 0.840*** 
 (0.213) (0.213) (0.217) (0.225) (0.235) (0.225) (0.230) (0.240) (0.258) (0.279) 
Leverage -0.903*** -0.960*** -0.958*** -0.913*** -0.962*** -1.081*** -1.107*** -1.124*** -1.126*** -1.146*** 
 (0.203) (0.207) (0.216) (0.229) (0.243) (0.242) (0.251) (0.263) (0.291) (0.311) 
Stock Return -0.001 0.046 0.067 0.050 0.142*** 0.117*** 0.134*** 0.116** 0.071 0.178*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.048) (0.049) (0.044) (0.048) (0.052) (0.057) (0.058) 
Stock volatility 1.023*** 0.908*** 0.651** 0.411 0.249 1.095*** 1.053*** 0.920*** 0.719** 0.487 
(0.268) (0.277) (0.272) (0.276) (0.287) (0.297) (0.320) (0.329) (0.338) (0.352) 
Ln (1+R&D 
exp.) 
7.726*** 7.469*** 7.604*** 7.649*** 7.776*** 9.207*** 9.151*** 9.326*** 9.678*** 10.160*** 
(0.986) (1.061) (1.123) (1.224) (1.370) (1.093) (1.215) (1.316) (1.503) (1.741) 
Constant -4.414*** -4.785*** -4.537*** -5.487*** -5.390*** -7.558*** -7.932*** -7.353*** -8.532*** -8.585*** 
 (0.871) (0.814) (0.763) (0.725) (0.812) (1.006) (0.976) (0.969) (0.848) (0.933) 
           
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,098 8,047 7,131 6,184 5,366 9,098 8,047 7,131 6,184 5,366 
R-squared 0.533 0.539 0.536 0.544 0.545 0.568 0.571 0.568 0.573 0.576 
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Panel B. Belief-dispersion with patent counts   
 
 Ln(1+Patent count) 
VARIABLES t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Dispersion 0.035 0.045 0.056 0.062 0.068 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.044) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,098 8,047 7,131 6,184 5,366 
R-squared 0.563 0.570 0.569 0.575 0.577 
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Table 4. The effect of belief dispersion around executive turnovers 
This table shows the effect of belief dispersion on firm’s innovative efficiency, surrounding executive turnovers. The indicator, treat, equals to 1 if a new 
joining executive sharply increases (top 25 percentile) the belief dispersion in the joining firm, and 0 otherwise. Firm-year observations are matched by the 
set of controls in the baseline regression (1) at the years when executive turnovers are happened. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix. All regressions 
control for the two-digit SIC code industry effects and year effects. t-Statistics are calculated based on robust standard errors (within parentheses) and clustered 
at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.    
Panel A: The difference in Dispersion (after 5 yrs. – before 5 yrs.) 
 The treatment group The control group Difference  (treat – control) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dispersion  0.311 -0.317 0.628*** 
 (0.049) (0.032) (0.061) 
 
 
Panel B: Regression results  
 Ln(1+Citation count) Ln(1+Patent value) Ln(1+Patent count) 
VARIABLES t+3 t+4 t+5 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+3 t+4 t+5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Treat 0.394* 0.610** 0.513** 0.569* 0.622* 0.770** 0.387** 0.421** 0.474** 
 (0.238) (0.252) (0.255) (0.313) (0.354) (0.352) (0.170) (0.196) (0.200) 
CEO 
Overconfidence  
-0.152 -0.184 -0.603* 0.038 -0.296 -0.450 -0.084 -0.297 -0.373 
(0.245) (0.267) (0.328) (0.297) (0.348) (0.372) (0.186) (0.220) (0.244) 
Ln(1+CEO 
Tenure) 
0.092 0.033 -0.166 0.112 0.032 -0.027 -0.263 -0.163 -0.257 
(0.142) (0.159) (0.596) (0.181) (0.212) (0.682) (0.342) (0.378) (0.445) 
Ln(1+ CEO 
Delta) 
0.115 -0.059 0.680 -0.330 -0.019 2.549 1.296 2.182* 1.919 
(0.438) (0.475) (2.057) (0.547) (0.628) (2.446) (0.991) (1.226) (1.662) 
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Ln(1+CEO 
Vega) 
-0.439 1.034 0.104 0.934 2.272 -0.043 0.073 0.014 0.000 
(1.455) (1.700) (0.167) (1.766) (2.046) (0.195) (0.112) (0.132) (0.139) 
Ln (1+sale) 0.585*** 0.505*** 0.527*** 0.854*** 0.711*** 0.713*** 0.440*** 0.367*** 0.400*** 
 (0.150) (0.173) (0.167) (0.173) (0.213) (0.192) (0.108) (0.138) (0.130) 
Ln(PPE/Emp) -0.036 -0.155 -0.197 -0.143 -0.130 -0.158 -0.080 -0.075 -0.095 
 (0.233) (0.215) (0.184) (0.261) (0.289) (0.222) (0.168) (0.182) (0.147) 
Institutional 
ownership  
1.050** 1.631*** 1.610*** 0.799 1.377* 2.080*** 0.356 0.715 0.985** 
(0.485) (0.523) (0.548) (0.625) (0.817) (0.701) (0.350) (0.470) (0.473) 
Ln(pay gap) 0.228 0.113 -0.207 0.613 1.373 0.789 0.363 0.670 0.795 
 (0.758) (0.897) (0.985) (0.951) (1.261) (1.244) (0.573) (0.732) (0.783) 
Leverage -2.136*** -1.349* -1.081 -2.848*** -2.478** -2.218** -1.721*** -1.414** -1.366* 
 (0.744) (0.768) (0.752) (1.066) (1.052) (1.053) (0.638) (0.672) (0.698) 
Stock Return 0.236 0.193 -0.090 0.304 0.245 0.043 0.288 0.268 0.118 
 (0.273) (0.280) (0.316) (0.337) (0.354) (0.335) (0.211) (0.217) (0.231) 
Stock volatility 0.409 0.620 -0.576 1.187 2.022 1.487 0.285 0.549 -0.097 
 (0.915) (1.004) (0.980) (1.223) (1.419) (1.429) (0.723) (0.875) (0.900) 
Ln (1+RD exp.) 8.291*** 8.462** 8.742** 9.673*** 7.786* 7.718* 6.581*** 6.467** 6.991*** 
(3.126) (3.508) (3.621) (3.700) (4.456) (3.999) (2.401) (2.875) (2.605) 
Constant -5.144** -5.566** -3.162 -7.060*** -9.317*** -8.774*** -3.031** -4.107** -4.524** 
 (2.074) (2.296) (2.622) (2.657) (3.046) (3.060) (1.483) (1.817) (1.956) 
          
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 270 218 188 270 218 188 270 218 188 
R-squared 0.572 0.591 0.563 0.580 0.585 0.629 0.612 0.610 0.618 
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Figure 1. innovation outcomes during dotcom bubble periods. 
Figure 1 presents the innovation outcomes for treatment group and control group over dotcom 
bubble periods. Innovation outcome measures by average citation and average patent value per 
year for the applied patents. The treatment group contains the high-tech firms with high belief 
dispersion in their TMTs. The control group includes firms in other industries or high-tech firms 
with low belief dispersion in their TMTs.  
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Table 5. Dotcom bubble  
This table shows the effect of the belief dispersion on firm innovation surrounding the dotcom 
bubble in 1999. Sample periods cover from 1996 to 2002, and 1999 is defined as the year when 
the bubble burst. The treatment group contains high-tech firms with high belief dispersion in pre-
bubble burst periods. The control group includes other firms in the sample. The definitions of other 
variables are provided in Appendix. All regressions control for the two-digit SIC code industry 
effect. . t-Statistics are calculated based on robust standard errors (within parentheses) and 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.     
Panel A: Difference in the differences of Dispersion (after – before) 
 
 Mean treatment difference  Mean control difference Mean DiDs (treat – control)  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dispersion  -0.463 -0.098 -0.365*** 
 (0.101) (0.021) (0.084) 
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Panel B: DiD regressions result 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(1+citation countt+1) Ln(1+patent valuet+1) Ln(1+patent countt+1) 
Treat 0.345 0.414 -0.057 
 (0.355) (0.364) (0.239) 
Treat*Post -0.709*** -0.824*** -0.213 
 (0.271) (0.282) (0.193) 
Post -0.809*** -0.615*** -0.281*** 
 (0.090) (0.098) (0.055) 
CEO Overconfidence -0.004 0.096 -0.028 
 (0.111) (0.112) (0.072) 
Ln(1+CEO Tenure) -0.030 -0.059 -0.043 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.032) 
Ln(1+ CEO Delta) -0.126 0.090 -0.115 
 (0.192) (0.219) (0.128) 
Ln(1+CEO Vega) 1.906*** 2.833*** 1.839*** 
 (0.577) (0.656) (0.389) 
Ln (1+sale) 0.734*** 1.003*** 0.558*** 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.040) 
Ln(PPE/Emp) 0.169* 0.244*** 0.148** 
 (0.094) (0.092) (0.060) 
Institutional ownership 0.273 0.177 0.039 
 (0.189) (0.209) (0.121) 
Ln(pay gap) 0.255 0.409 0.153 
 (0.308) (0.302) (0.191) 
Leverage -1.093*** -1.214*** -0.820*** 
 (0.271) (0.286) (0.178) 
Stock Return 0.081 0.163** 0.065 
 (0.067) (0.069) (0.040) 
Stock volatility 0.212 0.345 0.211 
 (0.361) (0.372) (0.232) 
Ln (1+R&D exp.) 12.531*** 14.360*** 9.054*** 
 (1.330) (1.403) (0.898) 
Constant -6.033*** -8.853*** -4.054*** 
 (0.803) (1.065) (0.803) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No 
Observations 3,334 3,334 3,334 
R-squared 0.559 0.620 0.618 
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Table 6: Instrumental-variable regressions 
This table presents the results of the instrumental-variable regressions. Belief dispersion is the endogenous variable. 
Lagged industry median value of this variable is the instrument. Industries are classified by the firm’s three-digit SIC 
code. In each Panel, Column 1 presents the first stage regression, and Columns 2-6 present the second-stage regressions. 
All regressions control for the two-digit SIC code industry effects and year effects. t-Statistics are calculated based on 
robust standard errors (within parentheses) and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significant level at 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Citation count  
 
 First-stage  Ln(1+Citation count) 
VARIABLES Dispersion t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dispersion (instrumented)  0.746** 0.839** 0.923** 0.798** 0.561 
 (0.348) (0.349) (0.361) (0.377) (0.355) 
Lagged IV 0.391***      
 (0.068)      
CEO Overconfidence 0.103*** -0.117 -0.094 -0.081 -0.068 -0.097 
 (0.017 (0.095) (0.098) (0.103) (0.106) (0.109) 
Ln(1+CEO Tenure) -0.020** 0.018 0.030 0.048 0.059 0.049 
 (0.010) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 
Ln(1+ CEO Delta) 0.365*** -0.465** -0.497** -0.499** -0.463** -0.344* 
 (0.044) (0.201) (0.204) (0.207) (0.213) (0.206) 
Ln(1+CEO Vega) -0.530*** 1.111** 0.962** 0.617 0.029 -0.559 
 (0.119) (0.468) (0.467) (0.468) (0.476) (0.472) 
Ln (1+Sale) -0.031*** 0.677*** 0.688*** 0.670*** 0.671*** 0.652*** 
 (0.009) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) 
Ln(PPE/Emp) -0.016 0.179** 0.168** 0.142* 0.135* 0.117 
 (0.011) (0.071) (0.074) (0.074) (0.076) (0.078) 
Institutional ownership 0.073** 0.285** 0.320** 0.318** 0.280* 0.344** 
 (0.031) (0.132) (0.133) (0.138) (0.144) (0.149) 
Ln(pay gap) 0.170** 0.402* 0.265 0.341 0.513** 0.708*** 
 (0.066) (0.241) (0.239) (0.243) (0.246) (0.252) 
Leverage -0.160** -0.644*** -0.607*** -0.554** -0.550** -0.566** 
 (0.070) (0.212) (0.220) (0.231) (0.233) (0.233) 
Stock Return 0.100*** -0.091 -0.047 -0.049 -0.034 0.069 
 (0.020) (0.056) (0.059) (0.061) (0.066) (0.062) 
Stock volatility 0.370*** 0.721** 0.475 0.113 -0.140 -0.285 
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 (0.073) (0.297) (0.308) (0.306) (0.314) (0.320) 
Ln (1+R&D exp.) -0.348 10.920*** 10.950*** 11.146*** 11.512*** 11.594*** 
 (0.291) (1.074) (1.143) (1.168) (1.248) (1.293) 
Constant -0.434 -9.213*** -9.317*** -9.216*** -9.334*** -9.081*** 
 (0.326) (0.639) (0.608) (0.628) (0.660) (0.751) 
       
F-statistic  166.21      
Observations 8,064 8,064 7,131 6,283 5,457 4,711 
R-squared 0.200 0.539 0.540 0.534 0.546 0.554 
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Panel B: Patent value 
 
 First-stage  Ln(1+Patent value) 
 Dispersion t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Dispersion 
(instrumented) 
 0.356 0.492 0.862** 0.998** 0.855** 
 (0.377) (0.386) (0.413) (0.458) (0.427) 
Lagged IV  0.391***      
 (0.068)      
CEO Overconfidence 0.103*** -0.009 0.027 0.018 0.015 -0.029 
 (0.017 (0.101) (0.108) (0.115) (0.123) (0.128) 
Ln(1+CEO Tenure) -0.020** -0.042 -0.020 0.008 0.041 0.029 
 (0.010) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.050) (0.050) 
Ln(1+ CEO Delta) 0.365*** -0.170 -0.238 -0.443* -0.483* -0.338 
 (0.044) (0.231) (0.242) (0.250) (0.267) (0.259) 
Ln(1+CEO Vega) -0.530*** 1.957*** 1.806*** 1.832*** 1.269** 0.365 
 (0.119) (0.540) (0.552) (0.570) (0.598) (0.604) 
Ln (1+Sale) -0.031*** 0.933*** 0.965*** 0.977*** 0.992*** 0.979*** 
 (0.009) (0.053) (0.054) (0.056) (0.058) (0.060) 
Ln(PPE/Emp) -0.016 0.233*** 0.219*** 0.199** 0.188** 0.154* 
 (0.011) (0.079) (0.082) (0.083) (0.085) (0.090) 
Institutional ownership 0.073** 0.212 0.253 0.285* 0.244 0.310 
 (0.031) (0.157) (0.162) (0.169) (0.182) (0.191) 
Ln(pay gap) 0.170** 0.668*** 0.516** 0.411 0.568** 0.834*** 
 (0.066) (0.250) (0.255) (0.266) (0.282) (0.302) 
Leverage -0.160** -0.896*** -0.785*** -0.719*** -0.700** -0.598** 
 (0.070) (0.248) (0.258) (0.276) (0.294) (0.299) 
Stock Return 0.100*** 0.082 0.091 0.026 -0.011 0.082 
 (0.020) (0.059) (0.064) (0.069) (0.078) (0.074) 
Stock volatility 0.370*** 0.779** 0.632* 0.342 0.012 -0.301 
 (0.073) (0.336) (0.362) (0.375) (0.388) (0.393) 
Ln (1+R&D exp.) -0.348 13.534*** 13.895*** 14.134*** 14.815*** 15.722*** 
 (0.291) (1.147) (1.221) (1.290) (1.409) (1.502) 
Constant -0.434 -12.133*** -12.810*** -12.606*** -12.890*** -12.815*** 
 (0.326) (0.856) (0.755) (0.749) (0.767) (0.844) 
       
F-statistic  166.21      
Observations 8,064 8,064 7,131 6,283 5,457 4,711 
R-squared 0.200 0.584 0.586 0.579 0.579 0.587 
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Panel C: Patent Count   
 
 First-stage  Ln(1+Patent count) 
 Dispersion t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dispersion (instrumented)  0.234 0.316 0.516** 0.671** 0.595** 
 (0.216) (0.222) (0.238) (0.282) (0.280) 
Lagged IV  0.391***      
 (0.068)      
CEO Overconfidence 0.103*** -0.083 -0.070 -0.086 -0.098 -0.106 
 (0.017 (0.065) (0.069) (0.075) (0.082) (0.087) 
Ln(1+CEO Tenure) -0.020** -0.015 -0.011 -0.002 0.016 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) 
Ln(1+ CEO Delta) 0.365*** -0.260* -0.262* -0.319** -0.374** -0.309** 
 (0.044) (0.136) (0.141) (0.145) (0.158) (0.157) 
Ln(1+CEO Vega) -0.530*** 1.362*** 1.277*** 1.194*** 0.906** 0.446 
 (0.119) (0.331) (0.336) (0.345) (0.363) (0.364) 
Ln (1+Sale) -0.031*** 0.535*** 0.555*** 0.557*** 0.573*** 0.570*** 
 (0.009) (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.043) (0.044) 
Ln(PPE/Emp) -0.016 0.157*** 0.153*** 0.142** 0.135** 0.124** 
 (0.011) (0.052) (0.055) (0.056) (0.059) (0.062) 
Institutional ownership 0.073** 0.068 0.108 0.121 0.096 0.150 
 (0.031) (0.096) (0.100) (0.104) (0.114) (0.122) 
Ln(pay gap) 0.170** 0.259 0.181 0.226 0.306 0.454** 
 (0.066) (0.161) (0.167) (0.176) (0.187) (0.197) 
Leverage -0.160** -0.542*** -0.523*** -0.510*** -0.531*** -0.497*** 
 (0.070) (0.155) (0.164) (0.174) (0.189) (0.193) 
Stock Return 0.100*** -0.005 -0.010 -0.046 -0.048 0.032 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.038) (0.041) (0.048) (0.048) 
Stock volatility 0.370*** 0.641*** 0.584** 0.375 0.064 -0.154 
 (0.073) (0.210) (0.228) (0.235) (0.247) (0.255) 
Ln (1+R&D exp.) -0.348 8.445*** 8.691*** 8.736*** 9.403*** 10.039*** 
 (0.291) (0.766) (0.827) (0.893) (0.982) (1.048) 
Constant -0.434 -6.389*** -6.937*** -7.147*** -7.336*** -7.336*** 
 (0.326) (0.652) (0.560) (0.476) (0.506) (0.536) 
       
F-statistic  166.21      
Observations 8,064 8,064 7,131 6,283 5,457 4,711 
R-squared 0.200 0.575 0.580 0.572 0.569 0.577 
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Table 7. Subsample analyses 
This table shows the differential effects of TMT’s belief dispersion across subsamples. CEO overconfidence is a dummy indicator, which equals to 1 if a CEO 
is overconfident, and 0 otherwise. CTO is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a TMT with at least one technology-related executive and 0 otherwise. HT is 
a dummy indicator and equals to 1 if a firm belongs to high-tech industry, and 0 otherwise. See Appendix for more detail of each used variable. All regressions 
control for the two-digit SIC code industry effects and year effects. t-Statistics are calculated based on robust standard errors (within parentheses) and clustered 
at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Ln(1+citati
ont+1) 
Ln(1+valuet
+1) 
Ln(1+paten
t+1) 
Ln(1+citati
ont+1) 
Ln(1+valuet
+1) 
Ln(1+paten
t+1) 
Ln(1+citati
ont+1) 
Ln(1+valuet
+1) 
Ln(1+paten
t+1) 
          
Dispersion -0.114 -0.066 -0.114** 0.062 0.097 0.005 -0.037 0.002 -0.017 
 (0.097) (0.095) (0.057) (0.059) (0.068) (0.037) (0.062) (0.073) (0.039) 
CEO Overconfidence -0.086 -0.032 -0.097 -0.029 0.021 -0.060 -0.026 0.027 -0.058 
 (0.090) (0.095) (0.061) (0.082) (0.086) (0.055) (0.082) (0.086) (0.055) 
CEO Overconfidence x Dispersion 0.267** 0.261** 0.175**       
 (0.117) (0.121) (0.069)       
CTO     -0.091 0.050 -0.027    
    (0.098) (0.109) (0.073)    
CTO x Dispersion    0.371** 0.427** 0.214**    
    (0.163) (0.167) (0.100)    
HT       0.041 0.097 0.158 
       (0.153) (0.170) (0.106) 
HT x Dispersion       0.482*** 0.495*** 0.161* 
       (0.131) (0.147) (0.083) 
Ln(1+CEO Tenure) -0.011 -0.058 -0.025 -0.009 -0.055 -0.024 -0.011 -0.059 -0.025 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.023) (0.035) (0.038) (0.023) (0.035) (0.038) (0.023) 
Ln(1+ CEO Delta) -0.245* -0.108 -0.179* -0.242* -0.104 -0.177* -0.253* -0.117 -0.182* 
 (0.144) (0.170) (0.101) (0.145) (0.172) (0.102) (0.145) (0.171) (0.102) 
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Ln(1+CEO Vega) 0.819** 1.967*** 1.236*** 0.780** 1.905*** 1.208*** 0.764* 1.913*** 1.208*** 
 (0.390) (0.461) (0.282) (0.391) (0.462) (0.283) (0.391) (0.459) (0.281) 
Ln (1+sale) 0.633*** 0.901*** 0.500*** 0.636*** 0.906*** 0.502*** 0.632*** 0.899*** 0.498*** 
 (0.043) (0.047) (0.032) (0.043) (0.047) (0.032) (0.043) (0.047) (0.032) 
Ln(PPE/Emp) 0.165** 0.233*** 0.143*** 0.164** 0.231*** 0.142*** 0.157** 0.223*** 0.136*** 
 (0.066) (0.073) (0.047) (0.066) (0.073) (0.047) (0.066) (0.073) (0.047) 
Institutional ownership 0.294** 0.200 0.077 0.293** 0.197 0.077 0.279** 0.181 0.062 
 (0.124) (0.146) (0.087) (0.124) (0.145) (0.087) (0.123) (0.145) (0.086) 
Ln(pay gap) 0.455** 0.598*** 0.290** 0.457** 0.602*** 0.291** 0.444** 0.586*** 0.283** 
 (0.211) (0.223) (0.140) (0.213) (0.224) (0.141) (0.213) (0.224) (0.141) 
Leverage -0.745*** -0.885*** -0.551*** -0.746*** -0.874*** -0.549*** -0.725*** -0.858*** -0.527*** 
 (0.188) (0.224) (0.137) (0.189) (0.224) (0.137) (0.187) (0.224) (0.137) 
Stock Return 0.002 0.121*** 0.032 -0.001 0.118*** 0.030 0.003 0.123*** 0.033 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.026) (0.040) (0.044) (0.026) (0.040) (0.044) (0.026) 
Stock volatility 0.795*** 0.792*** 0.614*** 0.775*** 0.755*** 0.600*** 0.758*** 0.744** 0.571*** 
 (0.265) (0.292) (0.186) (0.264) (0.290) (0.185) (0.263) (0.292) (0.185) 
Ln (1+R&D exp.) 10.827*** 13.227*** 8.195*** 10.839*** 13.163*** 8.189*** 10.559*** 12.873*** 7.895*** 
 (0.984) (1.076) (0.705) (0.985) (1.072) (0.704) (1.003) (1.102) (0.721) 
Constant -4.373*** -7.535*** -3.362*** -4.406*** -7.607*** -3.393*** -4.282*** -7.415*** -3.286*** 
 (0.825) (0.945) (0.722) (0.837) (0.947) (0.727) (0.839) (0.961) (0.733) 
          
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,098 9,098 9,098 9,098 9,098 9,098 9,098 9,098 9,098 
R-squared 0.541 0.578 0.574 0.542 0.579 0.575 0.543 0.580 0.576 
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Table 8. Belief dispersion with firm performance 
This table presents the regression of firm performance on belief dispersion. Firm performance is measured by 
Tobin’s Q, the ratio if market value to book asset, and ROA, the ratio of net income to book assets. Dispersion is 
the standard deviation of the confidence levels among firm’s top-five paid executives. Variable definitions are 
provided in the Appendix. All regressions control for the two-digit SIC code industry effect and year effect. t-
Statistics are calculated based on robust standard errors (within parentheses) and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, 
and * denote significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Qt+1 ROAt+1 Qt+1 ROAt+1 
     
Dispersion 0.330*** 0.019*** 0.380*** 0.017*** 
 (0.065) (0.006) (0.060) (0.004) 
CEO Overconfidence 0.155** 0.013** 0.156** 0.014*** 
 (0.074) (0.005) (0.074) (0.005) 
Ln(1+CEO Tenure) -0.126*** 0.000 -0.144*** -0.001 
 (0.038) (0.002) (0.041) (0.002) 
Ln(1+ CEO Delta) 0.911*** 0.017* 0.938*** 0.022*** 
 (0.151) (0.009) (0.145) (0.007) 
Ln(1+CEO Vega) -0.080 -0.032 -0.273 -0.006 
 (0.270) (0.021) (0.287) (0.019) 
Ln (1+Sale) -0.182*** 0.008*** -0.168*** 0.007** 
 (0.041) (0.003) (0.038) (0.003) 
Ln(PPE/Emp) -0.073* 0.001 -0.057 -0.002 
 (0.041) (0.003) (0.040) (0.003) 
Institutional ownership -0.075 0.041*** -0.049 0.041*** 
 (0.128) (0.009) (0.199) (0.012) 
Ln(pay gap) 0.617*** 0.016 0.637*** 0.006 
 (0.166) (0.012) (0.144) (0.013) 
Leverage 0.745 -0.118*** 0.768 -0.112** 
 (0.996) (0.043) (1.162) (0.047) 
Stock Return 0.461*** 0.030*** 0.428*** 0.037*** 
 (0.090) (0.009) (0.058) (0.005) 
Stock volatility -1.037*** -0.192*** -1.227*** -0.183*** 
 (0.173) (0.020) (0.192) (0.018) 
Ln (1+R&D exp.) 10.932*** -0.466*** 10.382*** -0.422*** 
 (2.111) (0.128) (2.359) (0.127) 
Board Size    -0.010 -0.002** 
   (0.014) (0.001) 
Board Independence   -0.254 0.005 
   (0.248) (0.014) 
Constant 1.532*** -0.037 2.206*** 0.026 
 (0.590) (0.044) (0.641) (0.062) 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089 
R-squared 0.199 0.174 0.117 0.045 
74 
 
Table 9. Endogeneity 
This table presents the results for mitigating endogeneity concerns. The 
regressions in Panel A use firm-fixed effects to control for firm specific time-
invariant factors. Panel B presents the result by using 2SLS approach. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. t-Statistics are calculated based on 
robust standard errors (within parentheses) and clustered at the firm level. ***, 
**, and * denote significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
Panel A: firm fixed effects regressions 
 Qt+1 ROAt+1 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
Dispersion 0.208*** 0.007* 
 (0.038) (0.003) 
CEO Overconfidence 0.071 0.019*** 
 (0.050) (0.004) 
Ln(1+CEO Tenure) -0.045** -0.002 
 (0.022) (0.002) 
Ln(1+ CEO Delta) 0.775*** 0.012 
 (0.082) (0.007) 
Ln(1+CEO Vega) -1.945*** 0.008 
 (0.223) (0.020) 
Ln (1+Sale) -0.398*** 0.006 
 (0.045) (0.004) 
Ln(PPE/Emp) -0.157*** -0.010* 
 (0.060) (0.005) 
Institutional ownership 0.094 0.015 
 (0.105) (0.009) 
Ln(pay gap) 0.367*** 0.013 
 (0.134) (0.012) 
Leverage 0.725*** -0.068*** 
 (0.145) (0.013) 
Stock Return 0.206*** 0.035*** 
 (0.033) (0.003) 
Stock volatility -0.184 -0.023 
 (0.181) (0.016) 
Ln (1+R&D exp.) 6.717*** 0.133* 
 (0.796) (0.072) 
Board Size  -0.077 -0.011 
 (0.150) (0.014) 
Board Independence -0.031*** -0.002* 
 (0.012) (0.001) 
Constant 4.484*** 0.029 
 (0.528) (0.047) 
   
Observations 7,877 7,877 
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  Industry No No 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.121 0.072 
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Panel B: 2SLS regression 
 
VARIABLES 
First-stage Qt+1 ROAt+1 
Dispersion 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
Dispersion(Instrumented)  0.475*** 0.026*** 
  (0.168) (0.009) 
Industry median (Dispersion) 0.795***   
(0.046)   
CEO Overconfidence 0.086*** 0.146** 0.013** 
 (0.012) (0.070) (0.005) 
Ln(1+CEO Tenure) -0.020*** -0.141*** -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.042) (0.002) 
Ln(1+ CEO Delta) 0.298*** 0.902*** 0.019** 
 (0.032) (0.171) (0.007) 
Ln(1+CEO Vega) -0.498*** -0.211 0.000 
 (0.079) (0.318) (0.019) 
Ln (1+Sale) -0.024*** -0.166*** 0.007** 
 (0.007) (0.039) (0.003) 
Ln(PPE/Emp) -0.006 -0.055 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.040) (0.003) 
Institutional ownership 0.056 -0.054 0.040*** 
 (0.029) (0.196) (0.012) 
Ln(pay gap) 0.149*** 0.615*** 0.004 
 (0.050) (0.151) (0.013) 
Leverage -0.137*** 0.786 -0.110** 
 (0.037) (1.144) (0.047) 
Stock Return 0.090*** 0.418*** 0.036*** 
 (0.014) (0.060) (0.005) 
Stock volatility 0.286*** -1.261*** -0.186*** 
 (0.058) (0.195) (0.018) 
Ln (1+R&D exp.) -0.289 10.391*** -0.421*** 
 (0.209) (2.340) (0.127) 
Board Size  -0.021 -0.253 0.005 
 (0.053) (0.247) (0.014) 
Board Independence -0.014*** -0.009 -0.002* 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.001) 
Constant 0.087*** 2.186*** 0.024 
 (0.011) (0.649) (0.061) 
    
F-statistic  224.63   
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,877 7,877 7,877 
R-squared 0.288 0.232 0.186 
Number of gvkey    
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Appendix 
This appendix defines the variables used in the study. Accounting data are from Compustat, 
stock return data from CRSP, patent data from Kogan et al. (2017), CEO incentives data from 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), and compensation data from ExecuComp. Patent data are 
aggregated at its application year for each firm-year observation.  
Variable  Description 
Dependent 
variable  
 
Log(1+patent) The natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents applied. 
Log(1+citation) The natural logarithm of one plus the number of future citation of a 
patent. 
Log(1+value) The natural logarithm of one plus a patent’s three-day announcement 
return, [t, t+2], around the patent issuance event. 
Tobin’s Q Ratio of market value to book assets. 
ROA Ratio of net income to book assets. 
Main 
independent 
variable  
 
Dispersion  Dispersion is the standard deviation of the confidence levels among a 
firm’s top-five executives, and executive confidence levels are 
calculated by following Campbell et al. (2011) overconfidence measure. 
Firm 
characteristics 
 
Log (1+Sale) The natural logarithm of one plus Firm sales scaled by total book asset 
at the end of fiscal year. 
Log(PPE/emp) The natural logarithm of a firm’s net property, plant, and equipment per 
employee  
Institutional 
ownership 
The percentage of firm shares outstanding held by institutional 
investors. 
Leverage  Sum of a firm’s total long-term debt and short-term debt scaled by total 
book assets at the end of fiscal year. 
Stock return  Buy-and-hold return of a firm shares over the fiscal year, adjusted by 
industry median.  
Stock volatility  The standard deviation of a firm shares monthly returns over the last 
five fiscal years. 
Log (1+R&D 
exp.) 
The natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s R&D expenditure, scaled by 
total book asset. Missing R&D values are set as zero. 
Log(pay gap) The natural logarithm of Pay gap, which is defined as the distance 
between CEO pay to the median pay of a VP in the firm. 
CEO 
characteristics  
 
CEO 
Overconfidence 
A dummy variable equals 1 for the CEOs holding over 67% deep in-
the-money options at least twice during the sample periods, and 0 
otherwise. 
Log(1+CEO 
Tenure) 
The natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s CEO tenure, defined as the 
number of years since the executive became a CEO.  
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Log(1+ CEO 
Delta) 
The natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s CEO delta, defined as the 
dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for a 1% change in stock price; see 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). 
Log(1+CEO 
Vega) 
The natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s CEO vega, defined as the 
dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for a 0.01 change in standard 
deviation of returns; see Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). 
Other control 
variables 
 
High Tech 
industry  
A dummy indicator equals to 1 if a firm belonged to High-tech industry, 
and 0 otherwise. Following Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr. (2003), high-
tech industry includes firms in SIC codes 3571, 3572, 2575, 3578 
(computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 
3674 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 
3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 4899 (communication 
services), and 7370, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 
(software).  
CTO A dummy indicator equals to 1 if a TMT with at least one technology-
related executive, and 0 otherwise. If an executive’s annual title contains 
words “technology,” “technical,” or “information”, the executive is 
defined as technology-related executive.  
 
 
 
 
